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RECENT DECISIONS
can there be "unwilling" intent to evade? An individual who intends
to evade the tax cannot help but act wilfully. The most plausible
reason for the distinction between civil and criminal fraud lies in the
burden of proof which the Commissioner must sustain in proving one
or the other. If he can prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt, criminal prosecution will be brought. If he has less evidence, he will bring
an action for civil fraud fot the very same act.
Under the Code, the distinction between civil fraud and negligence
is that in negligence there is no intent "to evade" the tax. Presumably,
the distinction will lie in what motivated the taxpayer's actions which
give rise to the delinquency.
In summary, where there has been an evasion of the tax, which of
the various penalties will be imposed will depend upon one or both of
these factors: the intent of the taxpayer as gleaned from the circumstances of the case, and the amount of evidence available to the Commissioner.
E. Milton Farley,III
Robert A. Layden

RECENT DECISIONS
BAILMENTS-CONTRACTUAL EXTENSION OF THE COMMON LAW LIAOF A BAILEE.-Perreault v. Circle Club, Inc. et al.- ....Mass ......

BLITY

95 N. E. (2d) 204 (1950). The plaintiff leased a television set to corporate defendant for one month with an option to buy. The lease
contained the following provision:
The lessee shall pay for any damage to the equipment during the term
hereof or while the same is in his actual possession or constructive possession, which may be due otherwise than the ordinary wear and tear incident to the normal use thereof, and at the termination of this agreement,
by the expiration of the terms hereof or otherwise, the lessee shall surrender to the lessor the said equipment in good order, repair and condition in all respects, reasonable wear and tear expected [excepted].

Subsequently, the set was stolen while in the possession of defendant,
but without negligence or fault on his part. The lower court decreed
that defendant pay plaintiff the value of the set, less rentals paid,
with interest, and upon appeal the decree was affirmed.
The issue raised in this case is whether the provision of the lease
increases the liability of a bailee for hire beyond the duty of ordinary
care to that of an insurer. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the defendant was liable absolutely, regardless of
fault, by the terms of his agreement.
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The court recognized that "in the absence of a contract increasing
the liability of a bailee, he is not liable for loss or damage occurring
without his fault." Amiro v. Crowley, 256 Mass. 53, 152 N. E. 78
(1926); Willet v. Rick, 142 Mass. 356, 7 N. E. 776 (1886). It also
pointed out that, according to the weight of authority, an agreement
by a bailee to "return the goods in the same condition as received,
ordinary wear and tear excepted" in the absence of a stipulation to
pay in case of non-delivery adds nothing to his common law liability.
See, e.g., Sanchez v. Blumberg, 176 S. W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915),
and cases cited by the court in the instant case. The reason is succinctly explained in Young v. Leary, 135 N. Y. 569, 32 N. E. 607, 609
(1892):
When language is used which does no more than express in terms the
same obligation which the law raises from the facts of the transaction
itself, the party using the language is no further bound than he would

have been without it.
It is generally recognized that parties can make special bailment
contracts changing the liability imposed by law, provided that such
contracts do not contravene a positive rule of public policy. Grady v.
Schweinler, 16 N. D. 452, 113 N. W. 1031 (1907). But the bailee
will never be presumed to become an insurer; the contract must clearly
show such an intent before he will be held to answer absolutely for
the loss of goods. McEvers v. The Sangamon, 22 Mo. 187 (1855);
Ames v. Belden, 17 Barb. 513 (N. Y. 1854). Courts have been reluctant to enlarge or restrict the ordinary obligations of a bailee
unless by specific and clear expression he has shown an intention to
change the common law incidents of the bailment relation. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Peterson Bros., 160 F. (2d) 124 (5th Cir.
1947); Marks v. New Orleans Cold Storage Co., 107 La. 172, 31 So.
671 (1901); Morgan v. Citizens Bank, 190 N. C. 209, 129 S. E. 585
(1925); Dodge v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 142 Tenn. 20, 215 S. W.
274 (1919); Fuchs, et al. v. Goe, 62 Wyo. 134, 163 P. (2d) 783
(1945). But where a bailee expressly promises to return the goods in
some stipulated condition or else to pay for them, courts have generally held him liable regardless of fault. Rainbow Petroleum Co. v.
Union Drilling & Petroleum Co., 115 Cal. App. 275, 1 P. (2d) 489
(1931); Drake v. White, et al., 117 Mass. 10 (1875); Axelrod v.
Purian,222 Mo. App. 201, 297 S. W. 151 (1927); Grady v. Schweinler,
supra; Rapid Safety Fire Extinguisher Co. v. Hay-Budden Mfg. Co.,
37 Misc. 556, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1008 (Sup. Ct. 1902); Triangle Film
Corp. v. Saks, 7 Ohio App. 458 (1917).
However, some authority does exist for the proposition that bailees
with or without special contract are excused when loss or injury is
occasioned by an act of God or the public enemy, Browning v. Hanford, 5 Hill 588 (N. Y. 1843). But thieves, tramps and robbers are
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not classified as public enemies in the legal sense of these words.
State v. Moore, 74 Mo. 413 (1881).
In its decision, nevertheless, the court relied heavily on two Massachusetts cases in which bailees were held liable without fault for loss
of the bailed article resulting from fire and wind; in each instance,
they had expressly agreed to return the goods or pay for them. Harvey v. Murray, 136 Mass. 377 (1884), and Drake v. White, supra.
In the Drake case, where a safe was destroyed by fire while in the
bailee's possession during the great Boston fire of 1872, the court said,
117 Mass. at 13:
...their express promise is to do one or the other of two things: either
to return the property specifically, or to pay for it in money. There can
be no doubt that if a creditor sees fit to accept a deposit of security upon
such terms, and to place himself in the position of an insurer of its safety,
he can legally do so....

There are relatively few cases of total destruction of bailed property
in the bailee's possession without fault on his part in which it was
held that the bailee was not liable where there existed a special con-'
tract to return or pa for the property. In those few cases there was
either an express exception, or the courts read into the contract ar
implied exception to the bailee's contractual obligations which relieved
him from paying for the property in case of destruction. In Whitehead
v. Vanderbilt, 10 Daly 214 (N. Y. 1881), the plaintiff loaned the defendant a horse on condition that he would return it at a certain time?
in good condition, unless he desired to purchase it, in which case, or
in event of failure to return it in good condition, the defendant should
pay plaintiff a stated sum. Before the time for return the horse died
without neglect of the defendant. The court discharged the bailee from
liability, reasoning that the continued existence of the subject of the
bailment was essential to performance of the contract, since the parties
clearly contemplated its being alive at the time fixed for return, and
since they abstained from making any provision in the event of death.
Of course where the bailor is a substantial factor in causing the destruction of the bailed goods, the bailee is released from his special
contractual liability. Famous Players Film Co. of New England v.
Salomon, 79 N. H. 120,106 Atl. 282 (1918).
A decision which releases the bailee from his specific agreement on
the basis that the parties contemplate the existence of the bailed
goods at the time fixed for return, the rationale of Whitehead v. Vanderbilt, supra, contradicts the overwhelming number of cases which have
held that a promise to return goods "in as good condition as received,
reasonable wear and tear excepted" is a mere recognition of the common
law duty of due care-since such provisions manifestly presuppose
the existence of the bailed goods at the time for return. The reasoning
of the Whitehead case hardly seems logical. In any event, in the in-
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stant case the bailed good was still actually in existence, even if it was
not in the bailee's possession, so that even if the argument were granted,
it was inapplicable here.
It could be contended that the bailor was in some wise responsible
for the non-performance of the bailee by not recovering his property
when notified, and that the argument of release outlined in Famous
Players Film Co. of New England v. Salomon, supra, would apply,
but again the bailee here hamstrung himself by expressly agreeing to
be responsible for the television set while in his "actual possession or
constructive possession."
The conclusion of the court, based upon the agreement of the
parties and previous judicial construction of similar lease provisions,
is reasonable, and is a clear demonstration of an instance where a bailee
may by express agreement increase his common law liability to that
of an insurer. In Gouled v. Holwitz, 95 N. J. L. 277, 113 Atl. 323,
324 (192"1), the situation is aptly phrased:
As a general rule, where a party contracts expressly to do a thing not
unlawful, the contractor must perform his agreement, and if, by some unforeseen accident, the performance is prevented, he must pay damages for
not doing it....
Where from the result of such an accident one of two
innocent persons must sustain a loss, the .law casts it upon him who -has
agreed to sustain it, or, rather, leaves it where the agreement of the parties
has put it, and will not insert for the benefit of one of the parties by construction an exception which the parties have, either by design or neglect,
omitted to insert in their agreement.

William J. Daner

CONFLICTS OF LAW-FEDERAL CouRTs-CHOIcE OF LAW GOVERNING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTACT S.Rhode Island Discount Co.

et al. v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 669 (Ct. Cl. 1951). The United
States Transportation Corps contracted with Somerset Shipyards, Inc.,
for the construction of barges. When the shipyards encountered financial difficulties, a supplemental contract was entered into whereby the
Government agreed, inter alia, to pay the shipyards' existing obligations. At the completion of the construction contract, the shipyards
was insolvent. Creditors and other claimants of the shipyards filed
this suit against the United States for moneys held for their benefit,
under the supplemental contract. The court denied this claim, holding
that the law of Massachusetts, which does not recognize the rights of
third party beneficiaries, governed the transaction.
In making the choice of Massachusetts law, the Court of Claims
was faced with the question of whether federal courts must look to
state decisions in determining the rights of parties to federal government contracts. That the problem of choice of law in federal courts
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was anticipated by the First Congress is attested to by Section 34 of
the Federal judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 92 (1789), which provided:
That the laws of the several states, except where the constitution,
treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts
of the United States in cases where they apply.

Justice Story rendered the landmark interpretation of this statute
in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (U. S. 1842), where he
concluded that "the laws of the several states" did not include the
decisions of state courts, and that the federal courts, therefore, were
not bound by the state courts' determinations of the general common
law. Under this interpretation there naturally arose a considerable
body of federal common law and, as a result, a dual system of justice
within each state. A plaintiff who was eligible to have his cause of
action determined in the federal courts had a choice of law; he could
enter the federal or state court depending upon whether the law in the
particular court favored his cause of action. See Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U. S.518, 48 S.Ct. 404, 72 L. Ed. 681 (1928).
To remedy this situation the Supreme Court was moved in 1938
in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L.
Ed. 1188 (1938), to overrule nearly a century of precedent. Justice
Brandeis uttered his oft-quoted, and often misunderstood statement:
"There is no federal general common law." For cases that were in
the federal courts by virtue of diversity of citizenship, as in the Eric
case, the statement was correct, but that this rule is strictly limited
to diversity cases was clearly pointed out in Hinderlider et al. v. La
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S.92, 110, 58 S.Ct.
803, 82 L. Ed. 1202 (1938), which was decided the same day as the
Erie case. It is clear that a federal common law does exist in nondiversity cases, and that the decision in the Erie case was intended only
to remedy the paradoxical situation of having two distinct bodies of
law applicable to the same matter, with possible contrary results depending upon which one was selected to govern. The Court in the Erie
case said, 304 U. S. at 74:
Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent
apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the
State. Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens
against citizens. It made rights enjoyed under the unwritten "general law"
vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the
federal court; and the privilege of selecting the court in which the right
should be determined was conferred upon the non-citizen.

The lower federal courts generally interpreted the rule of the Erie
case as not applicable to controversies arising out of government contracts, so that federal common law still governed. Girard Trust Co. v.
United States, 161 F. (2d) 159 (3rd Cir. 1947); Kolker v. United
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States, 40 F. Supp. 972 (D. Md. 1941); United States v. Grogan et al.,
39 F. Supp. 819 (D. Mont. 1941); Byron Jackson Co. v. United States,
35 F. Supp. 665 (S. D. Cal. 1940). Contra: Alameda County v.
United States, 124 F. (2d) 611 (9th Cir. 1941); United States v.
Brookridge Farms, Inc., 111 F. (2d) 461 (10th Cir. 1940).
In the cases concerned with the law applicable to government contracts reaching the Supreme Court after the Erie decision, there has
been unanimity in the determination that state law did not control.
Where a check, drawn on the Treasurer of the United States for services rendered in Pennsylvania, was stolen from the mail and negotiated in the same state, federal law controlled the rights of the parties.
Clearfield Trust Co. et al. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363, 63 S. Ct.
573, 87 L. Ed. 838 (1943). By issuing the check the Government was
held to be exercising a constitutional function in that the authority
to issue the check had its origin in the Constitution and the statutes
of the United States. This line of reasoning circumvents the provision
of the Federal Judiciary Act, now 28 U. S. C. § 1652 (Supp. 1950),
in slightly altered form, and the interpretation of it in the Erie case,
because that authority does not apply where "the Constitution or
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide .... "
Likewise, in United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U. S. 174,
182, 64 S. Ct. 908, 88 L. Ed. 1209 (1944), the Court stated:
Every acquisition, holding, or disposition of property by the Federal
Government depends upon proper exercise of a constitutional grant of
power .... It must be accepted as an act of the Federal Government warranted by the Constitution and regular under statute.
Procurement policies so settled under federal authority may not be defeated or limited by state law. . . . The validity and construction of contracts through which the United States is exercising its constitutional functions, their consequences on the rights and obligations of the parties, the
titles or liens which they create or permit, all present questions of federal
law not controlled by the law of any State.
It was determined by the Court that the provisions of a Government
contract were to be adjudicated by federal law, even though the
provisions stated that the Government was to retain ownership of
certain machinery annexed to an individual's realty. This holding frustrated a county's attempt to collect real estate taxes on the fixtures,
and clearly indicated that Government contracts were paramount to
local real property law.
In a third decision by the Supreme Court, Priebe and Sois, Inc. v.
United States, 332 U. S. 407, 411, 68 S. Ct. 123, 92 L. Ed. 32 (1947),
the Court declared that where Congress has not adopted a different
standard, it is customary to construe Government contracts according
to general common contract law. The Government contracted through
the Surplus Commodity Corporation to purchase eggs from Priebe.
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Priebe's claim for an amount unpaid on the contract was denied in
the Court of Claims on the basis of state law, but the Supreme Court
reversed since the general common law, not the state decisions controlled. In dissent Justice Black agreed that state law should not
control the decision but thought that federal common law, as distinguished from general common law, should govern. He stated, 332
U. S. at 414: "I regard the decisions of this Court since Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins ... . as having established that the construction and validity
of all government contracts are governed by federal law.... "
As the rule of the cases indicate, state decisions cannot control
the federal courts' determinations of cases arising out of Government
contracts. It is true that in the absence of any federal decisions on
a particular point the rule of the state involved may be applied to the
case. Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 289, 61 S.Ct.
995, 85 L. Ed. 1361 (1941). 8ut as a practical matter, with the federal government engaging in many diversified fields and, through its instrumentalities entering in many contracts, it would indeed place a cumbersome duty on the Government to require it to abide by the contract
rules of forty-eight states.
The instant case insofar as the court considered itself bound by
the Massachusetts rule on third party beneficiaries would seem to be
decided incorrectly. As the cases amply indicate, the Government,
when it does contract, is acting in pursuance of the "Constitution and
the Acts of Congress"; hence there is no reason to apply state rules
to these agreements.
William T. Huston

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-PREVENTION AND
PNISHrMNT.--Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S .....
, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95
L. Ed.....(1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S......
, 71 S.Ct. 312,
95 L. Ed.....(1951). Speaking for the Supreme Court in these companion cases, Chief Justice Vinson re-emphasized the policy of the
United States of safeguarding constitutional freedoms from oppression
while tolerating punishment by the states for their abuse.
The former case arose from the following facts: One evening petitioner Feiner stood on a public street corner and spoke through a loud
speaker in an attempt to persuade a racially-mixed crowd of about
seventy-five persons to attend an unpopular- political meeting and
listen to an address on civil liberties. In a "loud, high-pitched voice,"
he cast disparaging remarks upon certain public officials and, according to one version, urged the Negro people to "rise up in arms and
fight for equal rights." One of the crowd threatened to remove the
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petitioner from his box if the police .did not. The restless crowd was
"pushing, shoving and milling around" thereby forcing passing pedestrians to walk in the street. A police officer present, posted there to
prevent disorder and possible injury to pedestrians, requested the
petitioner "to get down off the box" and then vainly ordered him to
stop talking. For refusal to obey, Feiner was arrested and convicted
of disorderly conduct. The petitioner claimed the conviction violated
his right of free speech under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court held that the conviction, since it was for breach of peace
and violation of public order and authority and not for the making
of a speech or for the contents of the speech, was a proper exercise
of state police power; that here the Court could not say that the
preservation of the community's interest in the maintenance of order
and peace upon its streets was an encroachment upon the petitioner's
right of free speech. As stated in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652,
666, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925):
...a state in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse
this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open
to question.

The majority opinion in accepting the finding of the New York Court
of Appeals in New York v. Feiner, 300 N. Y. 391, 91 N. E. (2d) 316
(1950), that clear and imminent danger of disorder was threatened,
cited Cantwell et al. v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 308, 60 S. Ct. 900,
84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940):
When dear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety,
peace, or order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or punish
is obvious.

A "clear and present" danger is one in which there are reasonable
grounds for fearing that "serious evil will result" and for believing
that the "danger apprehended is imminent." Whitney v. California,
274 U. S. 357, 376, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927). "The evil
itself must be substantial and serious, and the degree of imminence
extremely high." Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 263, 62 S. Ct.
190, 86 L. Ed. 192 (1941). A "substantive evil" is a grievous impairment of an interest which to society is of equal or greater importance
than the societal interest in the constitutional freedom. Antieau, "Clear
and Present Danger"- Its Meaning and Significance, 25 NoT1m DAME
LAW. 603, 613 (1950).
In a dissenting opinion Justice Black did not think the facts showed
an "imminent threat of riot or uncontrollable disorder" and agreed
with the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas that if police interference was necessary it was to protect the petitioner's right to speak.
This view is supported by the decision in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
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U. S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed. 1131 (1949), where a speech not
only aroused animosity but incited an actual riot; yet it was held
not to be such a clear and present danger of a substantive evil sufficient to justify a restraint on free speech. But there the audience was
voluntary rather than happenstance, and the speech was delivered in
a private hall and not on a public street.
The viewpoint of the dissenting opinions in the Feiner case is better
seen in light of the Kunz decision. The appellant Kunz had been convicted of violating a city ordinance which required all persons holding
religious meetings upon the street to obtain a permit from the city police commissioner. The appellant had held a permit but it was revoked in 1946 because of complaints about his denunciation and ridicule of other religious beliefs. His subsequent applications for a permit
were disapproved, and he was eventually arrested for speaking at a
religious meeting without a permit.
The Court held the ordinance invalid as a prior restraint on the freedom of speech in that it vested a discretionary power in an administrative official "to control in advance the right of citizens to speak on religious matters on the streets of New York." 71 S. Ct. at 314. See
Saia v. New York, 334 U. S.558, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L. Ed. 1574 (1948)
(ordinance prohibiting use of amplifying devices on public streets except where permitted in discretion of the chief of police held invalid
as suppression of free speech); Cantwell et al. v. Connecticut, supra
(statute prohibiting solicitation of funds except for religious causes as
determined by an authorized official held invalid as censorship of religion); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U. S.147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed.
155 (1939) (ordinance requiring permit from police officer in order to
distribute literature from door to door held invalid because of arbitrary
power of censorship); Hague v. C. I. 0. et al., 307 U. S.496, 59 S.Ct.
954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939) (ordinance giving local officer discretionary
power to permit or refuse an assembly if in his opinion it would prevent disorder and riot held invalid as suppression of assembly); Lovell
v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938)
(ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature without a permit from
city manager held invalid as censorship of the press). But see Cox et
al. v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L. Ed. 1049
(1941) (ordinance requiring a permit to use the public streets for parades held valid as within proper control of municipal authority). But
cf. Myerson et al. v. Samuel et al., 74 F. Supp. 315 (E. D. Pa. 1947)
(where there was an ordinance prohibiting public meetings for other
than patriotic purposes in city parks, an injunction was granted restraining an official from interfering with the meeting, the reason being
that there was no evidence of a clear and present danger to our form
of government); State v. Klapprott et al., 127 N. J. L. 395, 22 A. (2d)
877 (1941) (an ordinance making it a misdemeanor for the utterance
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of any speech in the presence of two or more persons which proposes
hostility against any group because of race or religion was held invalid
as it was too subjective in application and the "clear and present danger" would not apply unless the utterance constituted a danger to the
state).
In his dissent to the Feiner case Justice Black stated that this decision in light of the Kunz decision meant, 71 S. Ct. at 311:
...that

while previous restraints probably cannot be imposed on an unpopular speaker, the police have discretion to silence him as soon as the
customary hostility to his views develops.

Therefore to him it seems that what is given by the Kunz decision is
taken away by the Feiner decision. On the other hand Justice Jackson
in a sharp dissent in the Kunz case thought that what was "order" in
the Feiner case became "chaos" in the Kunz case. He contended that
the majority opinion had based its decision in the Kunz case on the
assumption that Kunz had been exercising a constitutional right at the
time of his arrest. He quoted from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U. S. 568, 571-2, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942), where
Justice Murphy had said:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous and the insulting or "fighting" words - those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace.

Justice Jackson points out that if in the Chaplinsky case such words as
"God damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist" were held to be "insulting or fighting" words then here, certainly, such inflammatory statements as "the Pope is the anti-Christ" and "the Jews are Christ-killers"
are clearly more so when cast at Catholics and Jews. He further notices
the failure of the majority opinion to apply the "clear and present
danger" test as originally enunciated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v.
United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919);
that where "the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about . . . substantive evils" the words will not enjoy constitu-

tional immunity. The words used by Kunz were certainly insulting
and of a nature that when spoken in the environment of a public street
would tend to incite and provoke disorder. Considering the societal
interest in peace and order to be greater than its interest in allowing
free speech of that type, it follows that street fighting and riots are
substantive evils. Do away with the ordinance and Justice Jackson
anticipates an emergency arising wherever there is no police force present, or one too small to cope with what may be a castastrophe, because of lack of notice of the speech to take place. But as stated in
Antieau, supra at 606: "Freedom cannot be abridged if it is only the
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fear of future evils that haunts the official." However, state decisions
have long upheld the authority of the municipality to control its streets.
Ex Parte Bodkin, 86 Cal. App. (2d) 208, 194 P. (2d) 588 (1948) (an
ordinance directing police officers to keep streets and sidewalks unobstructed was held valid); Hamilton v. Montrose, 109 Colo. 228, 124
P. (2d) 757 (1942) (an ordinance prohibiting the use of loud sounding
devices on city streets as a means for attracting crowds was held valid);
Harwood v. Trembley, 97 N. J. L. 173, 116 At. 430, 431 (1922)
("liberty of speech no more authorizes a citizen to appropriate to his
own use the public property of a community for the purpose of exercising that guaranty than it permits him to occupy in invitum the private property of a fellow citizen for the same purpose"); Barker et al.
v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. 412, 413 (1852) ("liberty of speech does not
require that the clear legal rights of the whole community shall be violated"). But cf. Commonwealth v. Surridge, 265 Mass. 425, 164 N. E.
480 (1929) (where if the right to assemble obstructs a public way it
cannot be exercised to the detriment of the public even though municipal authorities issued a permit for the assembly).
An analogy can more clearly, perhaps, show the effect of the majority
opinions in the Feiner and Kunz cases and their respective dissenting
opinions. Herein, the right to sow seed equates the right to free
speech, weeds symbolize words of evil import or portent, and hay fever
represents the crowd's disorderly reaction. If A desires to sow seed in
a field belonging to both A and B, the Kunz case holds that B cannot
prevent A from doing so. Nor can B interfere with A because in the
past the seed produced a field of weeds. However, if B catches hay
fever from A's production of weeds the Feiner case holds that A may be
punished. justice Black would assert that since A has the right to plant
seed he has a right to be protected in cultivating the plants produced,
nor can he be punished for causing B's hay fever as that would make his
original right to plant seed a precarious one. Justice Jackson would disagree on the basis that the right to sow seeds means only the right to
produce plants which do not cause hay fever, and further that A's past
misconduct in producing weeds justify B in preventing A from sowing
more weeds. However, it is doubtful that past misconduct will justify a
prior restraint against a constitutional freedom. Near v. Minnesota, 283
U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931) (an injunction restraining the publication of a newspaper because of past misconduct in
its publication was invalid as an infringement of freedom of the press).
In Milk Wagon Drivers Union et al. v. Meadowmoor Dairies,Inc., 312
U. S. 287, 61 S. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836 (1941), an injunction against
peaceful picketing was sustained only because the past misconduct had
a continuing coercive effect of violence to justify an infringement on
freedom of speech.
The majority opinion of the Kunz case pointed out that if the fear
of public disorder or violence should materialize public remedies were
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available, and indicated by its decision in the Feiner case that actual
violence need not occur to justify state police action. But an utterance
may be prevented or punished only when violence is so very likely to
follow upon it that there is no chance to interpose an effective counterargument, and where such violence is a substantive evil which the state
may constitutionally seek to prevent. American Communication Ass'n,
C. I. 0., et al. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 70 S. Ct. 674, 94 L. Ed. 597
(1950). The attitude of the Court seems to be expressed in De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278 (1937):
Rights of free speech .. . may be abused by using speech ...

in order

to incite to violence and crime. The people through their legislatures may
protect themselves against that abuse. But the legislative intervention
can find constitutional justification only by dealing with the abuse. The
rights themselves must not be curtailed.

The permit system which the Kunz case held invalid is justified by
Justice Jackson as a means for maintaining "good order." And "order"
as he sees it is a means for protecting the civil liberties of the greater
number. See his dissenting opinion in Terminiello v. Chicago, supra
337 U. S. at 14 (".

. must [we] forego order to achieve liberty"?).

But the majority opinions seem to present the best solution by a checking-balance of social values so that order does not suppress liberty or
liberty abuse order. However, the Feiner and Kunz cases still do not
appear to answer the question asked by Mr. Justice Jackson: By what
clear standards may "legitimate speaking" be distinguished "from that
acknowledged to be outside of constitutional protection."
James D. Matthews

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
-REFUSAL

TO TESTIFY CONCERNING MEMBERSHIP IN OR AFFILIATION

WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY.-Patricia Blau v. United States, 340
(1950); Irving Blau v. United
U. S...... 71 S. Ct. 223, 95 L. Ed States, 340 U. S- ..... 71 S. Ct. 301, 95 L. Ed .- (1951). The petitioners, Patricia and Irving Blau, husband and wife, were found guilty
of contempt for refusal to answer questions concerning the Communist
Party of Colorado before a grand jury and the federal district court.
As ground for their refusal, both witnesses invoked the privilege against
self-incrimination of U. S. CONST. AMEND. V. The provisions of the
Smith Act, 18 U. S. C. § 2385 (Supp. 1950), making it a crime, inter
alia, to advocate the desirability of overthrowing the Government by
force; to organize or assist in the organization of any society or group
which advocated forceful overthrow of the Government; or to join or
belong to a revolutionary group of the type described, was in force at
the time of the Blaus' appearance before the grand jury. The court
of appeals affirmed the convictions, 179 F. (2d) 559 (10th Cir. 1950);
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180 F. (2d) 103 (10th Cir. 1950). The Supreme Court, in the instant
cases, reversed both convictions, holding in the Patricia Blau decision that the accused could reasonably fear that criminal charges might
be brought against her if she admitted employment by or intimate
knowledge of the Communist Party. The Court declared, 71 S. Ct. at
224:
Whether such admissions by themselves would support a conviction under a criminal statute is immaterial. Answers to the questions
asked by the grand jury would have furnished a link in the chain of
evidence needed in a prosecution of petitioner for violation of (or conspiracy to violate) the Smith Act.

Irving Blau's conviction was reversed expressly on the authority of
the reasoning of the first Blau case. An additional element in Irving
Blau's conviction, a claim of privilege against disclosure of a marital
communication, was upheld against a dissent; however, this aspect
will not be discussed here.
In these cases the Supreme Court has simply reaffirmed the classic
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., United States v. Burr (In re Willie), 25 Fed. Cas.
38, No. 14,692e (C. C. D. Va. 1807); Mason v. United States, 244
U. S.362, 37 S. Ct. 621, 61 L. Ed. 1198 (1917). See also Corwin,
The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29
MIcE. L. REv. 1 (1930); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1949); Rapacz, Rules Governing the
Allowance of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 19 MINN. L.
REv. 426 (1935); Note, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Federal Court: Problem of Communist Affiliation, 26 NoTR DAmE LAW.
68 (1950).
That an investigation by a grand jury is a "criminal case" within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment is no longer open to question.
United States v. Monia et al., 317 U. S.424, 63 S.Ct. 409, 87 L. Ed.
376 (1943); Camarato v. United States, 111 F. (2d) 243 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U. S. 651, 61 S.Ct. 16, 85 L. Ed. 416 (1940). It
is generally agreed that the privilege against self-incrimination, both at
common law and as embodied in the constitutions of the several states
and of the United States, is applicable to all judicial investigations and
proceedings. Congressional investigations and hearings are likewise
susceptible to invocation of the privilege. See Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U. S. 547, 563, 12 S. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110 (1892); United
States v. Goodner et al., 35 F. Supp. 286, 290 (D. Colo. 1940). See
also, 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (3rd ed. 1940); Godlewski, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Before the House Committee on
Un-American Activities, 1 INTRAMU RAL L. REV. (St. Louis U.) 15
(1949); Morgan, supra at 30; Notes, Privilege -Against Self-Incrimination in Federal Courts: Problem of Communist Affiliation, 26 NoTRm
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DAmm LAW. 68, 71 (1950);

Applicability of Privilege Against Self-

Incrimination to Legislative Investigations, 49 COL. L. Rav. 87 (1949).
The principal cases are the first definite pronouncements by the
Supreme Court on the refusal to answer questions regarding Communist membership or affiliation on the ground of privilege against selfincrimination. These two decisions reversing the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit dearly fall in line with pronouncements on this
same matter by the other circuit courts. See, e. g., Estes v. Potter,
183 F. (2d) 865 (5th Cir. 1950); Kasinowitz v. United States, 181 F.
(2d) 632 (9th Cir. 1950); Doran v. United States, 181 F. (2d) 489
(9th Cir. 1950); Alexander v. United States, 181 F. (2d) 480 (9th
Cir. 1950); United States v. Rosen, 174 F. (2d) 187 (2d Cir. 1949).
A decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Lawson v. United States, 176 F. (2d) 49 (D. C. Cir. 1949), appears at
first blush to conflict with the decisions in the other circuits. During
the questioning of two Hollywood screen-writers before a Committee
of the House of Representatives on Un-American Activities, the witnesses were asked whether they were members of the Communist Party
or believers in Communism, and one was asked whether he was a member of a certain writer's guild. They refused to answer and were convicted under the statute, 52 STAT. 942 (1938), 2 U. S. C. § 192 (1946),
giving Congress power to impose criminal punishment for failure or
refusal to answer pertinent and proper questions of legislative inquiry.
Their argument was that the Bill of Rights protected all persons against
compulsory disclosure of their private beliefs and associations regardless of what they may be, and that a person may not be punished for
remaining silent as to those beliefs and associations. The court stated
that defendants' contention was not a novel one and, in affirming the
conviction, disposed of the argument, relying on Barsky et al. v.
United States, 167 F. (2d) 241 (D. C. Cir. 1948). The court's omission of any reference to the Fifth Amendment is explainable by the
fact that the defendants had not specifically appealed to the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination when they refused to answer.
The privilege must be affirmatively invoked; it cannot arise automatically. It is in this respect that the Lawson decision can be distinguished from the holdings in other circuits.
Several state court decisions are worthy of mention. Two of
these, Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America, -___Ohio App ..... 92 N. E. (2d) 431, appeal dismissed, -___Ohio ..... 93 N. E. (2d) 480 (1950), 26 NoTvE DAmrE LAw.
130 (1950); State v. James, __ Wash. ..... , 221 P. (2d) 482 (1950),
held that the answers to questions concerning Communist Party membership or affiliation were not sufficiently incriminating to enable the
party to invoke the privilege. These well-reasoned opinions are only
analagous to the situation in the instant cases if: (1) the state had a
statute similar to the Smith Act, supra, and (2) a privilege against
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self-incrimination as broad as that granted by the Federal Constitution,
as interpreted by the federal courts, existed in the state. It must also
be realized that a witness cannot invoke the privilege in a state proceeding in responge to questioning that might incriminate him under a
federal statute, for instance the Smith Act.
In State ex rel. Benemovsky v. Sullivan, -___Fla .....
37 So. (2d)
907 (1948), the court drew a distinction between the Communist Party
and a criminal communistic party, i.e., one engaged in criminal communistic activities, and concluded that invocation of the constitutional
privilege would be upheld in the latter case only. Obviously, the court
did not believe the Communist Party to be intrinsically one of criminal activity.
Before the Supreme Court's reversal of the decisions in the Blau
cases, the Tenth Circuit court handed down Rogers v. United States,
179 F. (2d) 559 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 339 U. S.956, 70 S.Ct.
978, 94 L. Ed. 1368 (1950), which has recently been affirmed by the
Supreme Court, 340 U. S .....
71 S. Ct. 438, 95 L. Ed-...(1951).
Here, the witness testified that she held an official position in the
Communist Party of Colorado, but refused to answer questions which
would have elaborated upon her position and activities. The Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction for contempt upon a finding that the
witness had not invoked the privilege against self-incrimination until
after she had voluntarily testified to her status in the Communist Party.
It was held that a "real danger" of further incrimination and an expanding possibility of prosecution must exist before a witness may refuse to answer questions which would merely elaborate on the answer
to a previously unprotested question. The Court further stated, 71
S. Ct. at 442:
Disclosure of a fact waives the privilege as to details.

As this

Court stated in Brown v. Walker . . . : "Thus, if the witness himself

elects to waive his privilege, as he may doubtless do, since the privilege
is for his protection, and not for that of other parties, and discloses
his criminal connections, he is not permitted to stop, but must go on
and make a full disclosure."

The dissent, 71 S. Ct. at 443, 446, criticized the majority by dedaring that adoption of the rule of waiver relegated the privilege to a
second-rate position, and that "today's expansion of the 'waiver' doctrine improperly limits one of the Fifth Amendment's great safeguards."
Although this language would lead to the belief that the majority had
improperly extended the "waiver" doctrine, there is ample authority
for the propriety of the decision. See the decisions of state courts
collected in United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F. (2d) 837, 839 (2d Cir.
1942), and Note, 147 A. L. R. 255 (1943).
American courts today are faced with more than the mere determination of whether in a given instance the privilege against self-incrimination has been properly invoked. The problem has grown more serio
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ous and complex. More specifically, judicial wisdom and insight is
faced with the problem of protecting our constitutional liberties and
freedom from those who would use these constitutional liberties and
freedom to destroy them, without infringing upon'those traditional
American institutions. The difficult position of the American judge in
this situation was accurately defined by Mr. Justice Jackson in Williamson et al. v. United States, 184 F. (2d) 280, 283 (2d Cir. 1950),
where he stated:
My task would be simple if a judge were free to order persons imprisoned because he thinks their opinions are obnoxious, their motives
evil and that free society would be bettered by their absence. The plea
of admitted Communist leaders for liberties and rights here, which they
deny to all persons wherever they have seized power, is so hypocritical
that it can fairly and dispassionately be judged only with effort.

Today as in the past a serious threat to the continuance of free
government exists in the nature of certain persons and certain organizations. Federal legislation directed against the godless political
ideology described as Communism and its activities has been profuse.
See Sutherland, Freedom and Internal Security, 64 HARV. L. Rv. 383
(1951). Congress has passed the Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub.
L. No. 831, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 23, 1950), specifically providing under section 4(f), that "neither the holding of office nor membership in any Communist organization by any person shall constitute per
se a violation [of the Act] or of any other criminal statute." Exactly
what effect, if any, this Act will have on further litigation involving
the refusal of persons to testify as to their communistic beliefs, affiliations, and activities is at present purely problematical and speculative.
Benedict R. Danko

CORPORATIONS-REiMBURSEMENT BY CORPORATION FOR ExPENSES
INCURRED BY DIRECTOR IN SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING A STOCIKHIOLD-

ER'S DERIVATIVE SUIT-NECESSITY FOR SHOWING A CORPORATE BENEFIT.-In re E. C. Warner Co.. ....Minn ..... 45 N. W. (2d) 388 (1950).
In a well-documented decision the Supreme Court of Minnesota held
that a director who successfully defended himself in a stockholder's
derivative suit was entitled to reimbursement for reasonable attorney's
fees. The court further stated that it was not necessary for recovery
to show that the action resulted in a benefit to the corporation.
A. E. Wilson, president and treasurer of the E. C. Warner Co., was
sued, in the original action by minority stockholders, for waste and depletion of assets allegedly caused by his dereliction of duty. The suit
was terminated on the merits in favor of Wilson. The present action
was instituted by the attorneys, who had defended Wilson in the de-
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rivative suit, to recover their fees from the corporation. The court,
after discussing at some length the nature of a derivative suit, the position of the corporation therein, and the relationship of a director to the
corporation and to the stockholders, held for the attorneys. In allowing
this recovery, the court had the greatest difficulty in overcoming the
benefit theory involved in cases of this nature. See Solimine v. Hollander et al., 129 N. J. Eq. 264, 19 A. (2d) 344 (1941); New York
Dock Co. v. McCollom et al., 173 Misc. 106, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 844
(S. Ct. 1939); Griesse et al. v. Lang et al., 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.
E.222 (1931).
The benefit theory specifies that the corporation will not be liable
for attorney fees where the director prevails unless some specific benefit can be shown to have accrued to the corporation itself. As a general rule stockholders who bring a derivative suit have recourse to the
corporation for expenses only when the suit results in a tangible recovery for the corporation. Sagalyn et al. v. Meekins, Packard &
Wheat, Inc. et al., 290 Mass. 434, 195 N. E. 769 (1935); Goodwin v
Milwaukee Lithographing Co. et al., 171 Wis. 351, 177 N. W. 618
(1920). The courts seem to apply this rule by analogy to directors
without considering the different relationships of the respective parties
to the corporation. The theory and its incidents have been the subject
of much discussion. See, e.g. Washington, Litigation Expenses of Corporate Directors in Stockholders' Suits, 40 COL. L. REv. 431 (1940);
Comment, 30 CALIF. L. REv. 667 (1942). For the converse problem
of the stockholder-prosecutor's expenses, see Hornstein, The Counsel
Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COL. L. REv. 784 (1939).
After stating that there were conflicting views as to the necessity of a
benefit, the Minnesota Court reasoned that policy, both business and
public, dictated that reimbursement be allowed. A refusal of payment,
it concluded, would place "a premium upon faithless and irresponsible
corporate leadership and action," and would result in a refusal by "men
of substance" to assume the responsibilities of directorships. An additional, and possibly a sounder reason, was ti at the right to recovery
of expenses by a successfully defending director would tend to discourage strike suits-suits brought merely to harass the corporate
official.
With the exception of New York, very few courts have dealt with
the general subject and fewer still have considered the benefit problem.
It appears that the first case concerned with the general subject is
Figge v. Bergenthal et al., 130 Wis. 594, 109 N. W. 581, 592 (1906),
in which the officer involved was allowed his attorney's fees on the
somewhat nebulous grounds that "if no case is made against defendants it is not improper or unjust that the corporation should pay for
the defense of the action." This case limited recovery to officers under
its particular facts, but it has been widely cited in support of the
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right to reimbursement of directors. A second Wisconsin case, Jesse
et al. v. Four-Wheel Drive Auto Co. et al., 177 Wis. 627, 189 N. W.
276 (1922), derives its importance from the fact that it was referred
to in a later Ohio case, Griesse et al. v. Lang et al., supra, as overruling Figge et al. v. Bergenthal et al., supra. Actually the Jesse case
did not mention the Figge case nor was it in point since it was concerned with personal dealings between the defendant-director and a stockholder and no corporate interest was directly involved. Nevertheless,
the Ohio court in the Griesse case refused to recognize the general
right of recovery, and for the first time the benefit doctrine appeared.
The court stated that before the corporation would be liable for attorney's fees, the director seeking such recovery must affirmatively
show a benefit to the corporation arising from the litigation. The similar decision of New York Dock Co. v. McCollom et al., supra, was
partially a result of the Griesse case. In the McCollom case the court
stated that the possibility of suit was one of the risks of the office,
and that neither authority nor equitable considerations gave a right
of reimbursement.
It is interesting to note, as a possible solution to the problem, that
the New York legislature passed a statute shortly after the decision in
this case applicable to the situation. N.w YoRkx GENERAL CoRP'oRATION LAW § 63. This statute provided for recovery of expenses incurre'd by officers or directors in successfully prosecuting or defending
a suit. The New York Courts have declared it constitutional. Hayman et al. v. Morris et al., 179 Misc. 265, 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 782 (S. Ct.
1942). It is not applicable unless there is a final exoneration on the
merits. Neuberger et al. v. Barrett et al., 180 Misc. 222, 39 N. Y. S.
(2d) 575 (S. Ct. 1942). It is also held that no common law right
existed as to such indemnity, Bailey et al. v. Bush Terminal Co., 267
App. Div. 899, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 877 (S. Ct. 1943), aff'd. 293 N. Y.
734, 56 N. E. (2d) 739 (1944). But the Supreme Court for Kings
County rendered the statute completely useless as a cure for the
benefit doctrine by reverting to the McCollom doctrine. In Dievas v.
Lekas et al., 182 Misc. 567, 48 N. Y. S. (2d) 785 (S. Ct. 1944), that
court held that the statute was intended to reward only those who
had brought money into the treasury or prevented others from taking
it out - the benefit theory. It appears that New York still follows
this rule.
Whether or not there was a benefit to the corporation, the director
was allowed reimbursement by merely winning the case on the merits
in Solimine v. Hollander, supra. One of the objections to the general
right of recovery was overcome by the court in stating that the stockholder would not be overwhelmed by the financial power of the corporation since the payment was to be made only in the event that the
director prevailed. The court commented at length on the McCollom
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case, particularly and unfavorably on the expression in that case that
liability to suit was one of the hazards assumed by a director in accepting the position. Although the showing of a benefit was held to be
unnecessary, the court stated that in this case the director had actually
conferred a benefit on the corporation-that by winning the suit the
director demonstrated to the investment public the honesty of the corporate management. This dictum appears to be a liberalization of the
benefit- idea, which originally specified that the benefit must be something brought into the treasury or prevented from being removed, to
include intangible advantages to the corporation.
That the rule regarding the necessity of a corporate benefit in expense cases is unsettled is apparent. As pointed out by the Minnesota
court in the instant case, the decision in controversies of this nature are
of importance because of their potential effect on the economy as a
whole. An additional factor to be taken into account in finally determining the question is the practical viewpoint with regard to the director. That is, the relative impossibility on the part of the director
of showing a pecuniary benefit to the corporation, since in most instances
the derivative suit would result in a pecuniary benefit to the corporation only when it is won by the stockholder bringing the suit. As a result, the fact that the director prevails in the suit may mean that the
corporation, as the real party in interest, has suffered a detriment. A
consideration of the fact that most directors get a very small salary or
none at all, and the potentiality of the strike suits mentioned by the
Minnesota court should also be realized as bearing on the problem. On
the other hand the derivative suit, the efficiency of which may be questioned, seems to be the only protection, other than the dubious value of
the right to vote, afforded to the minority. The burden of proving a
director negligent or fraudulent is very difficult and particularly so in
larger corporate units. A director knowing that if he defends the suit
successfully he will be reimbursed from corporate funds may overpower
the stockholder by expending far more in his defense than he otherwise
would have done.
Statutes similar to New York's may provide the answer but as seen
from the cases, the courts will still construe them as they deem fit and
proper as regards the benefit doctrine. The corporations themselves
can meet the difficulty through by-laws or special contracts providing
for reimbursement of the directors. Without the general use of such
provisions, however, the courts must still decide the cases. If they
apply the benefit rule, and it appears from a consideration of the above
factors that they should, the construction placed on the term should
be liberal so as to include such intangible benefits as were mentioned
in Solimine v. Hollander et al., supra.
John E. Lindberg
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-GROUNDS

FOR ANNULMENT-SUFFICIENCY

OF FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATION OF PRIOR ILLEGITIMATE OFFSPRING.

-Rhoades v. Rhoades, -N. J ..... , 77 A. (2d) 273 (1950). To the
wife's suit for separate maintenance on grounds of abandonment and
non-support, the defendant husband counter-claimed for annulment alleging that he had been induced to marry her because of false representations that an illegitimate child had been born as a result of the
prior illicit relations of the parties. The marriage took place in July,
1947; cohabitation continued until August, 1948, at which time the
husband was informed of the falsity of the wife's story and terminated
the marital relations. It was not shown that the husband had made
any attempt, either before or after the marriage ceremony, to verify
the wife's claims, except for questions concerning the child's whereabouts directed to the wife herself. Affirming the trial court's dismissal
of the counterclaim, the Superior Court of New Jersey held that, as a
matter of law, a false representation of illegitimate offspring resulting
from prior illicit relations is not of that species of fraud going to the
essence of the marriage contract sufficient to void it.
The question presented by this case arises from the judicial conflict
as to what type of false representations will constitute fraud sufficient
to justify the annulment of a marriage; more specifically, whether the
fraud rule applicable to ordinary civil contracts applies to marriage
contracts, or whether the marriage contract is peculiar in itself. To
justify annulment must there be proof of fraud of an extreme character affecting its very essence?
Proper analysis of the question posed will necessitate the examination
of the marriage contract in order to determine if it is essentially the
same as an ordinary civil contract. Story declared, STORY, CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 108 n.4 (4th ed. 1852),that it is:
. . . something more than a mere [civil] contract. It is rather to be
deemed an institution of society, founded upon the consent and contract
of the parties; and in this view it has some peculiarities in its nature, character, operation, and extent of obligation, different from what belong to
ordinary contracts.

The marriage contract is sui generis in many respects; that is, it is
of its own kind or class, and peculiar to itself. Carris v. Carris, 24
Ecclesiastical authority, MARRIAGE PREPARAN. J. Eq. 516 (1873).
TION SERVICE, UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA

175 (1946), states that:

This contract consists essentially in the mutual consent of the husband
.. by which the husband and wife give and receive reciprocand wife..
ally, in a permanent and exclusive manner, the conjugal right to procreate.
As a result of this mutual consent, Matrimony becomes a lasting union
of the man and woman and constitutes a permanent manner of living. The
purpose of this union is the procreation arid education of children, mutual
help of husband and wife, and the legitimate satisfaction of the instincts
that God has placed in human nature.
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Marriage is a status more than it is a contract, notwithstanding the
fact that free mutual assent is necessary to it.
There is a definite split of authority as to what type of false representations will constitute fraud sufficient to justify the annulment of a
marriage. The major premise of the majority rule is that the fraud
must go to the very essentials of the marriage contract. In Hyslop v.
Hyslop, 241 Ala. 223, 2 So. (2d) 443 (1941), the court held that
where the husband entered into marriage with intent not to consummate the marriage, followed by immediate disavowal and refusal to
perform, there was fraud that went to the essence of the marital relation. See Stegienko v. Stegienko, 295 Mich. 530, 295 N. W. 252
(1940); Allen v. Allen, 126 W. Va. 415, 28 S. E. (2d) 829 (1944).
Where the sole motive of the defendant in entering marriage was to
obtain for himself a preferential entry into the United States, this
false representation was sufficient to warrant annulment. Babis v.
BabisDel. ..... , 75 A. (2d) 580 (1950). In a case very similar to
the instant case, the court held that the fraud relied on did not go to
the essentials of the marriage and therefore did not grant annulment.
There the woman falsely represented to the man, with whom she had
had an illicit relationship, that she was pregnant by him, thereby persuading him to marry her. Brandt v. Brandt, 123 Fla. 680, 167 So.
524 (1936). A Missouri court, in Watson v. Watson, 143 S. W. (2d)
349 (Mo. App. 1940), granted annulment where the wife fraudulently
misrepresented and concealed the fact that she was suffering from
syphilis at the time of marriage. The court concluded that the fraudulent concealment went to the very essence of the marriage. In Akrep
v. Akrep, 1 N. J. 268, 63 A. (2d) 253 (1949), a Catholic wife was induced to consent to a civil marriage on her husband's promise, which
he did not intend to keep, that they would subsequently have a religious ceremony in keeping with the wife's religious obligation. The marriage was never consummated. The court held that the wife was entitled to annulment. Thus it can be seen that under the majority
essentalia doctrine the fraud must go either to the capacity of the parties
to make the contract, or their ability and intent to perform its fundamental and basic obligations. All other fraud is considered immaterial and not actionable.
The minority rule rests in the stronghold of the New York courts.
Following DiLorenzo v. DiLorenzo, 174 N. Y. 467, 67 N. E. 63 (1903),
the New York courts have held that proof of fraud sufficient to set
aside an ordinary contract is all that is required to terminate the marriage relationship. Thurber v. Thurber, 186 Misc. 1022, 63 N. Y. S.
(2d) 401 (S. Ct. 1946); cf. Schwind v. Schwind, 99 N. Y. S. (2d) 108
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1950); King v. King, 98 N. Y. S. (2d) 686
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1950). The very recent case of WoronzoffDaschkoff v. Woronzoff-Daschkoff, 100 N.Y.S. (2d) 441 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
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County 1950), exemplifies the extent to which the courts of New York
have gone in granting annulments for fraud. The defendant represented that he was marrying plaintiff for love and not for her money,
and that he would earn his own living, which in fact he did not do nor
intend to do. The court held that such representations were material
to the decision of the plaintiff to marry the defendant, and thereby
granted her relief. It appears that the court placed a very high premium upon the subjective idea of the plaintiff as to what was material.
In Croce v. Croce, 100 N. Y. S. (2d) 97 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1950), the court, while following the DiLorenzo doctrine, tended to
straddle the fence by stating that the fraud must go to the very essence
of the marriage contract. In that case the husband attempted to get
an annulment because his wife deceived him as to the virtue of her
daughter by a prior marriage. He discovered that the daughter had
two illegitimate children and sought annulment on that ground. The
court held that the husband must be held to have acquiesed, and having consummated the marriage, would not be heard to complain. It
was apparent that the husband's claim was of strained construction, and
afforded the court ample room in which to assert statements sounding
of the essentalia doctrine. Other New York cases, in which appear
traces of this doctrine are, Siek v. Siek, 196 Misc. 165, 93 N. Y. S. (2d)
470 (1949), aff'd, 276 App. Div. 1035, 95 N. Y. S. (2d) 234 (3d.
Dept. 1950), and, more distinctly, in Washburn v. Washburn, .Misc....,
62 N. Y. S. (2d) 569, 570 (S. Ct. 1946), where the court said:
Fraud sufficient to vitiate a marriage contract must go to the very
essence of the contract. Promises of undying love and affection, of dutiful
and faithful cunnubial demeanor, and of comfortable and happy home
surroundings are insufficient, notwithstanding plaintiff's claim that he relied upon such promises and would not have entered into the marriage
had the same not been made.... After the marriage has been consummated, and presumably the marriage -herein was consumated, the fraud
is not material unless it goes to the essentials of the contract.

It is submitted that these three cases are not significant, inasmuch, as
in none of them were the false representations relied upon of any great
import, i. e., they were fairly obvious decisions to make because in none
of them were the essentials of the marriage contract under attack.
The vast majority of New York cases follow the very liberal view
of DiLorenzo v. DiLorenzo, supra, with a few cases here and there holding to the contrary, Washburn v. Washburn, supra. In almost every
type of circumstance the New York courts have granted the relief
prayed for; see Notes 9 BRK. L. REV. 51 (1940); 41 CoL. L. REv. 503

(1941). This is undoubtedly caused by the strict New York statutory
divorce law which allows divorce only for adultery; N. Y. Dom. REL.
LAW § 6. Thus, the courts are prone to allow annulment on the most
liberal grounds possible.
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In the principal case, the court found that the husband indulged
himself in blind credulity in failing to investigate the claim of his
former paramour before marrying her. But the fact that no child actually was born could in no way affect the life of the parties during
their marriage; they possessed the ability to produce children and
carry on a normal married life together. Hence, the fraud did not go
to the essence of the marriage in any respect, and this decision is in
accord with the majority and preferable rule today. To be sufficient
to warrant an annulment, the fraud must go to the very essence of
the marriage relation, especially where, as in the principal case, the
marriage has been consummated and the parties have assumed all the
mutual rights and duties of the relationship.
Maynard R. Bissonnette

EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTIONS-FREEDOM

FROM CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-

EYEwITNESS.-Riedesel v. Koch et al.. ....Iowa
45 N. W. (2d) 225 (1950). The plaintiff's decedent was killed in a
collision between an automobile owned by the defendant, R. T. Koch,
being operated by his son, Donald, and a bicycle operated by the decedent, who died of injuries the day following the accident.
The defendant excepted to the court's instruction on the no-eyewitness rule, arguing that defendant and his guest were eyewitnesses;
that whether they were eyewitnesses was properly a jury question so that
no instruction should have been given to apply the rule. In sustaining
the trial court the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the no-eyewitness
rule was properly applicable to the case and that it was to be considered to determine whether the negligence of decedent contributed
to his injury.
In the absence of eyewitnesses or other direct evidence, the noeyewitness rule raises a presumption in favor of the deceased that he
was in the exercise of ordinary care when the accident occurred. Mast v.
Illinois C. R. R., 176 F. (2d) 157 (8th Cir. 1949). In determining
who is an eyewitness, a court has held that one who observed the deceased person during the material part of the transaction in the moments preceding the accident is an eyewitness. Graby v. Danner,
236 Iowa 700, 18 N. W. (2d) 595 (1945); Hayes v. Stunkard, 233
Iowa 582, 10 N. W. (2d) 19 (1943). In Patterson v. Pittsburg,C. C.
& St. L. R. R., 210 Pa. 47, 59 At. 318 (1904), a fireman who observed the deceased as he approached a railroad crossing, was held not
to be an eyewitness since physical conditions were such that deceased
was not at all times within his range of vision.
By the great weight of modern authority the burden of proof of
contributory negligence is upon the defendant. Washington and
GENCE IN ABSENCE OF
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Georgetown R. R. v. Glandmon, 15 Wall. 401, 21 L. Ed. 114 (U. S.
1872); Vanceburg Telephone Co. v. Bevis, 148 Ky. 285, 146 S. W.
420 (1912); Hopper, McGaw & Co. v. Kelly, 145 Md. 161, 125 AtI.
779 (1924); Cooperstein v. Eden Brick & Supply Co., 238 N. Y. 200,
144 N. E. 501 (1924); PROSSER, ToRTs § 42 (1941). The instant
case, however, follows an earlier view, still prevalent in a few jurisdictions, which places upon the plaintiff the burden of proving due care
on his part. Kotler v. Lalley, 112 Conn. 86, 151 Atl. 433 (1930);
Holt v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 318 Ill. App. 436, 48 N. E. (2d) 446
(1943); Spooner et al. v. Wisecup et al., 227 Iowa 768, 288 N. W. 894
(1939). The obvious hardship of this burden to the plaintiff is immediately evident where there have been no eyewitnesses to the injury.
Generally ithas been held that inthese instances, or where there isno
other direct evidence obtainable relating to the conduct of the deceased, the presumption is that he was in the exercise of ordinary care
for his own safety. Downing v. Southern Pac. Co. et al., 15 Cal. App.
(2d) 246, 59 P. (2d) 578 (1936); Edwards v.Perley et al., 223 Iowa
1119, 274 N. W. 910 (1937).
It was said inAmes v. Waterloo and C. F. Rapid Transit Co., 120
Iowa 640, 95 N. W. 161 (1903), that the rule raising a presumption of
freedom from contributory negligence when there were no eyewitnesses
to the accident arose from the common law rule imposing the duty upon
the plaintiff to prove a lack of contributory negligence. It was introduced in order to avoid the patent injustice which would result in cases
where there was no evidence, one way or the other, of the exercise of
due care by the injured party, and where no such evidence was obtainable by reason of the death of the party injured and the absence
of any proof of the circumstances attending the injury. If there were
no affirmative evidence showing due care by the decedent, the plaintiff
would fail to meet his burden, and would automatically lose. The
basis and the application of the no-eyewitness rule is exceptionally well
stated in Downing v. Southern Pac. Co. et al., supra, 59 P. (2d) at 583:
The presumption is one which may be invoked for the benefit of
plaintiff when unable to produce any eyewitnesses to a collision, and is
based upon the sound foundation of the natural law of self-preservation.
Where it is possible to call eyewitnesses to testify positively to the facts
and circumstances surrounding the accident, the presumption is not applicable.

In CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §1963 (4) (1949), itissuccinctly pointed
out, "That a person takes ordinary care of his own concerns ....." The

same theory is enunciated in Crabbe v. Mammoth Channel Gold Mining
Co., 168 Cal. 500, 143 Pac. 714, 716 (1914), with the added observation
that: "This is a controvertible presumption ...

but until controverted it

is evidence in accordance with which the jury is bound to decide."
It seems to be definitely established that the majority of those
jurisdictions which place the burden of disproving contributory negli-
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gence upon the plaintiff generally adhere to the no-eyewitness rule.
Nevertheless, even within these jurisdictions there has been a hard
core of conflict. The rationale adopted by the courts refusing to apply
the no-eyewitness rule concedes, that although it is a well-nigh universal characteristic of human nature for men to have an instinctive impulse to avoid physical pain and death, nevertheless, neither this nor
any other universal instinct prevents them from being careless. Very
few men intelligently seek death, but very many are guilty of negligence
leading to fatal results. As was said in Wright v. Boston & M. R. R.,
74 N. H. 128, 65 Atl. 687, 690 (1907):
The instinct of self-preservation may furnish an explanation or excuse for his careless acts after he got into a place of danger, but it is
not evidence that his acts were the acts of an ordinarily prudent man before the danger became imminent.

Also, see Collison v. Illinois C. R.R., 239 Ill. 532, 88 N. E. 251 (1909);
Wisniewski v. New York C. R.R., 228 App. Div. 27, 238 N. Y. Supp.
429 (4th Dep't 1930).
It must be noted in this connection that in New York (a jurisidiction
which requires the plaintiff to show freedom from contributory negligence), by virtue of statute, the plaintiff in an action for wrongful
death no longer has the burden of proving freedom from contributory
negligence. The statute expressly provides that "the contributory
negligence of the person killed shall be a defence, to be pleaded and
proven by the defendant." N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW §131. In
effect, this has been regarded as merely raising a presumption that the
deceased was free from contributory negligence, thus placing the
burden on the defendant of proving otherwise. See RIcHARDSON, EviDENCE §137 (7th ed. Prince 1948).
The Missouri courts admit the artificiality of the no-eyewitness
rule agreeing that the instinct of self-preservation in man is present
to the same degree in cases of accidents observed by eyewitnesses as
in those not so witnessed. However, in the same breath the courts of
this state invoke the presumption as the only clear remedy for a
difficult procedural situation. Wolf v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 374
Mo. 622, 148 S.W. (2d) 1032 (1941).
The no-eyewitness rule and the presumption raised by it is of
importance only in jurisdictions which place the burden of proof of
freedom from contributory negligence squarely upon the plaintiff.
Wabash R. R. v. De Tar, 141 Fed. 932 (8th Cir. 1905). Otherwise
it merely amounts to an application of the rule of the burden of proof,
or of a permissible inference from ordinary experience. See, 15 MINN.
L. REv. 473 (1931).
These presumptions and inferences seem highly artificial, and are
plainly contrived to escape the harsh common law rule, still surviving
in a large minority of jurisdictions, whereby the plaintiff must estab-
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lish due care on the part of the decedent. As pointed out, the noeyewitness rule has no basis in logic or fact. It is merely another
cumbersome necessity created by the preservation of a common law
rule. The presumption has no logical application where the burden is
upon the defendant to show contributory negligence, since it has no
application when evidence of the conduct of the deceased is introduced,
unless it would be given some weight as an inference. Placing by
statute the burden of proof upon the defendant to establish contributory negligence on the part of decedent, already the rule in the majority of jurisdictions by decision, appears to be the logical path to
follow for those states still adhering to the inadequate common law
rule. With the elimination of the rule demanding the plaintiff prove
freedom from contributory negligence, there would be no necessity for a
no-eyewitness rule.
Joseph H. Harrison

EvIDENCE--WIRETAPPING--DEFENDANT'S RIGHT To EXAMINE DATA
AS HAVING BEEN USED IN EVIDENCE OR AS HAVING GIVEN LEADS TO

EVIDENE.-United States v. Coplon, 185 F. (2d) 629 (2d Cir. 1950).
Judith Coplon was convicted of conspiring to defraud the United
States and of attempting to deliver defense information to a citizen
of a foreign nation. At her trial it was shown that the Government
had gathered information of her activities by wiretapping. The taps
were recorded by automatic recording discs and handwritten logs.
For use at the trial, copies of the originals were given the defendant
to enable her to see that none of the evidence introduced had been
obtained from the taps, because under the Federal Communications
Act, 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 605 (1946), evidence and
leads to evidence acquired as a result of wiretapping is inadmissible in federal courts. However, certain passages had been expurgated from the copies because it was thought that their disclosure
would be inimical to national security. The trial judge examined the
original discs and logs in private and was of the opinion that they did
not constitute leads to the Government evidence, but he refused to
allow the defendant to examine them on the ground that they contained information vital to national security.
In reversing the conviction, the court of appeals held that if the
Government is in possession of any information secured through wiretapping, the accused has the right to inspect all that data to determine
whether any of it has been used in evidence, or as leads to other evidence, introduced against him at the trial. It is not sufficient that the
trial judge, in camera, determine whether or not the evidence introduced was obtained, directly or indirectly, through wiretapping activi-
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ties, even though the reason for the private examination by the judge
is national security.
The decision in the instant case brings to light a conflict between
society's right to protect state secrets from public disclosure and the
defendant's right in a criminal prosecution to determine that no illegal
evidence is introduced against him at the trial.
Divulgence of information obtained by unauthorized interception
of telephone messages is forbidden under the Federal Communications
Act, supra. Evidence obtained by wiretapping, Nardone et al. v.
United States, 302 U. S. 379, 58 S. Ct. 275, 82 L. Ed. 314 (1937),
or as a result of wiretapping, Nardone et al. v. United States, 308 U. S.
338, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939), is inadmissible in federal
courts. Consequently, the* accused has a right to examine in open
court all wiretapping information obtained by the prosecution and to
determine for himself whether the wiretappings were used as evidence
or as leads to evidence. In other words the accused has the privilege
of examining documents that are inadmissible as evidence.
There can be no distinction between introducing evidence which
the defendant is not allowed to examine and denying him the right
to introduce evidence in his own behalf. Both suppress information
vital to the accused's defense. But there is also the extremely important right of society to have state documents privileged from disclosure because they contain secrets vital to the security of the nation.
This privilege from disclosure is accorded to official documents because
public policy requires secrecy of the proceedings of certain branches
of the government that the national interest may better be served.
Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459, 20 S. Ct. 701, 44 L. Ed. 846
(1900); Brewer et al. v. Hassett, 2 F. R. D. 222 (D. Mass. 1942).
But this privilege is not absolute. If the documents are the basis
of a criminal prosecution, their confidential nature is terminated to
the extent that the Government must choose either to "leave the transactions in the obscurity from which a trial will draw them, or it must
expose them fully." United States v. Andolschek et al., 142 F. (2d)
503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944). See also United States v. Krulewitch, 145
F. (2d) 76 (2d Cir. 1944); Fleming v. Bernardi, 1 F. R. D. 624
(N. D. Ohio 1941).
The general rule is that to be subject to inspection documents must
be evidence themselves, because the right to inspect documents does
not give the accused the right to inspect memoranda in the possession
of the prosecution which are inadmissible as evidence. People ex rel.
Lemon v. Supreme Court of New York et al., 245 N. Y. 24, 156 N. E.
84 (1927); Lehan v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 169 Wis. 327, 172 N. W.
787 (1919). Neither can the accused's demand for an inspection be
in the nature of a fishing expedition nor constitute an unfounded prob.
ing into the prosecution's case. United States v. Warren, 53 F. Supp.
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435 (D. Conn. 1944). But whenever it appears that the production
of documents is necessary for the support of the defense, the power
to compel the production should be exercised. Miller v. Price, 260 Ky.
488, 86 S. W. (2d) 152 (1935); Sprinkle v. State, 137 Miss. 731, 102
So. 844 (1925). When the prosecution is in possession of evidence
favorable to the defendant, it should be made available to him. People
v. Walsh et al., 262 N. Y. 140, 186 N. E. 422 (1933); Gaffney v.
Kampf, 182 Misc. 665, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 151 (S. Ct. 1944). This
production of evidence must be made in open court and not merely to
the judge in a private inquiry, for such a procedure "would invade
not only the constitutional rights of persons accused of crimes . . .
but would be contrary to correct ideals of judicial procedure." Caldwell v. State, 164 Tenn. 325, 48 S.W. (2d) 1087, 1097 (1932). See
also Ross v. State, 130 Tenn. 387, 170 S.W. 1026 (1914).
When the Federal Government is in possession of wiretapping
records, the burden is on the prosecution to prove that they did not
provide leads to trial evidence. United States v. Goldstein et al., 120
F. (2d) 485 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd, 316 U. S. 114, 62 S. Ct. 1000, 86
L. Ed. 1312 (1942); this burden cannot be met by the trial judge's
scrutiny in camera, but only by examination in open court, because
under the Sixth Amendment the accused has a right to a "public trial"
and "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U. S. CONST.
AMEND. VI; United States v. Barracota et al., 45 F. Supp. 38 (S. D.
N. Y. 1942).
While the authorities cited above strongly support the decision
handed down in the principal case, it has been held that the constitutional right of the accused to be confronted with the witnesses
against him is not applicable to the proof of facts which in their nature
are essentially documentary. People v. Purcell, 22 Cal. App. (2d) 126,
70 P. (2d) 706 (1937); People v. Reese, 232 App. Div. 624, 250 N. Y.
Supp. 392 (1st Dept. 1931), rev'd on other grounds, 258 N. Y. 89,
179 N. E. 305 (1932). The distinction made in these cases between
oral and documentary evidence seems unfounded. If certain documents
were lost the prosecution would have to prove the subject matter contained in the missing documents by the oral testimony of witnesses.
The accused could not be denied the right of examining the witnesses;
neither does there seem to be any logical reason why he should be
denied the right to inspect documents placed in evidence. In proving
a writing production must be made, unless it is not feasible, of the
writing itself whenever the purpose is to establish its terms. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1178 (3d ed. 1940).
There are two English cases that may throw some light on the
problem. In Hennessy v. Wright, 21 Q. B. D. 509 (1888), a civil suit
for libel, the court refused the defendant's request to inspect documents in the plaintiff's possession on the ground that they contained
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privileged matters of state, even though the defendant claimed the
documents would vindicate him. Justice Field, speaking for the court
in dicta said, 21 Q. B. D. at 515:
... I should consider myself entitled to examine privately the documents
to the production of which he objected, and to endeavor, by this means
and that of questions addressed to him, to ascertain whether the fear of
injury to the public service was his real motive in objection.

This decision seems to form a precedent for the trial judge's action
in the Coplon trial of examining the original taps in private, but
actually it forms a precedent for the dicta in United States v. Andolschek et al., supra, where it was held that the Government is not required to publicize privileged documents in civil suits between third
parties, although such documents might serve to settle the controversy. In a memorandum dissent in Beatson v. Skene, 5 H. & N. 838,
157 Eng. Rep. 1415, 1422 (1860), it was contended that a judge
should examine documents privately to determine whether their exhibition would prejudice the public interest, and if it would not, to compel their production notwithstanding the reluctance of the government. The majority held however that if a document is privileged,
its production in court could not be compelled. These English cases
seem to support the view of the trial judge that if documents are
privileged because they contain state secrets they do not have to be
produced at a trial, even though they could provide a favorable defense for the defendant. But it must be remembered that these are
both civil cases where society's right to protect state secrets is opposed
merely by a defendant's personal right to adequately defend in a suit
for damages. In the civil case the right of society is not outweighed
by the defendant's personal right and therefore no production of
privileged communications is compelled. But in criminal cases the
public right of society to prevent disclosure of privileged documents
is opposed by the right of the accused to be confronted with the witness against him and of a public trial, and these rights are public
rights available to all citizens under the Constitution, U. S. CONST.
AMND. VI. According to the dicta in the Andolschek case, in criminal
prosecutions these rights outweigh the right of society to protect state
secrets, and the production of documents relevant to the defense in
a criminal prosecution will be compelled. Therefore the decision in
the principal case is not contrary to the English cases, and also finds
a number of established precedents in American cases. United States
v. Andolschek et al., supra; United States v. Krulewitch, supra;People
v. Walsh et al., supra.
From a consideration of the law preceding the decision in the instant
case, it is to be concluded that the doctrine that a defendant in a
criminal case is entitled to examine all the evidence introduced against
him at the trial has been extended; the defendant has now the right
to examine all material and information in the possession of the prose-
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cution that is the basis of the evidence, in order to determine for
himself the legality of its procurement. In cases where the material
and information consists of privileged documents demanding secrecy
in the public interest, the prosecution will be faced with the choice
of exposing the documents or discontinuing the action. Inasmuch as
allowing the trial judge to privately examine the documents for the
defendant would violate the constitutional rights of a trial in open
court and confrontation by witnesses, the only plausible remedy for
the situation is statutory amendment to permit admission in federal
courts of evidence secured through wiretapping. While this decision
may be a logical outgrowth of established precedents, it places on the
Government a difficult choice, the burden of which may prove too
onerous for efficient criminal prosecution, especially with regard to
seditious and treasonable activities.
Peter J. Donahue

INSURANCE-PRINCIPAL

AND

AGENT-EFFECT OF CONTRACTUAL

AGENT.-Fay v. Swicker et
al.; Lara v. Swicker et al. .-- Ohio
, 96 N. E. (2d) 196 (1950).
Plaintiffs recovered judgments for damage resulting from an automobile accident. The judgments being unsatisfied, the plaintiffs filed supplemental petitions against the insurance company which had issued
an automobile liability policy to the defendant. When applying for
the policy, the defendant gave true answers to questions asked by the
agent who nevertheless inserted false answers in the application. The
defendant, without reading the application, signed it. By the terms
of the written application, the defendant expressly warranted the
statements to be true and agreed that the insurance company might
rely upon those statements in issuing the policy, which it did. The
policy contained a provision which stated that no knowledge possessed
by the agent should estop the company from asserting any rights under
the policy, or effect a waiver or change in any part of the policy. After
the defendant's accident with the plaintiffs and notice of it to the
insurance company, the latter learned of the falsity of the recorded
answers in the application, and declared the policy void from the beginning.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Ohio, held that the parties
could enter into a valid contract which substituted a different rule for
the common law doctrine of imputed knowledge and agree that it
should not be binding on them, even in view of Ohio Gen. Code Ann.
§ 9586 (1938), which made the solicitor an agent of the insurer. Such
an agreement was held not contrary to public policy. The court relied
LIMITATION UPON THE AUTHORITY OF AN
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upon the agreement in the application and the insurance policy, both
of which abrogated the common law rule of imputed knowledge.
The question in this case was whether the insurer and the insured
can supplant the common law rule imputing knowledge of an agent
to his principal, by an agreemefit that notice to, or knowledge of, an
agent should not estop the principal from asserting any right under the
terms of the policy.
It is a general rule of agency that notice to, or knowledge of, an
agent while acting within the scope of his authority and in reference
to a matter over which his authority extends is notice to, or knowledge
of, the principal. 2 MECHEM, AGENCY § 1803 (2d ed. 1914). The
reason for the rule was stated in the leading case of Kennedy v. Green,
3 My. & K. 699,40 Eng. Rep. 266, 274 (1834):
. . . policy and the safety of the public forbids a person to deny knowledge while he is so dealing as to keep himself ignorant, or so as that he
may keep himself ignorant, and yet all the while let his agent know, and
himself, perhaps, profit by that knowledge.
In such a case it would be most iniquitous and most dangerous, and
give shelter and encouragement to all kinds of fraud, were the law not
to consider the knowledge of one as common to both, whether it be so
in fact or not.

The foundation of this rule is based upon two general theories. The
first is that the agent is legally identified with the principal during the
continuance of the agency. The second is that it is the duty of the
agent to disclose to his principal all knowledge which the agent may
possess and which appears to be necessary for the principal's protection or guidance. The law conclusively presumes that the agent has
performed this duty. 2 MECHEM, supra, §§ 1805-6.
There are two incidents of the agency relationship which are especially important in insurance law. One is that the principal is liable for
any fraud or wrong perpetrated by the agent while acting within the
scope of his employment. The other is that any information material
to the transaction which is either possessed by the agent at the time
of the transaction or acquired by him before its completion is deemed
to be knowledge of the principal, at least in so far as the transaction
is concerned, even though in fact the knowledge is not communicated
to the principal. VANCE, INSURANCE § 117 (2d ed. 1930). These
incidents of agency are created by law and are not contractual in na.
ture. The insurer is bound by the knowledge acquired by his agent
in making the contract, not because he consented to be charged, but
because of the legal consequence of the relation he sustains to the
agent. It follows, therefore, that since this incident is created by law,
it should not be alterable or destroyable by an agreement of the parties.
The cases which hold otherwise are ignoring the basis upon which it
is founded. So, when a loss caused by a dishonest agent must fall on
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either the principal or the third party, both innocent, the courts should
not hesitate to put the burden on the party who selected the agent.
See VANCE, supra, § 117.
The common law principle being well established, it necessarily follows that any general limitation or agreement to the effect that knowledge acquired by the agent shall not be imputed to the principal is but
an attempt to contract away a rule of law, which attempt has been
held to be nugatory. Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170
N. Y. 13, 62 N. E. 763 (1902).
Since the principal cannot wholly escape the operation of this rule
of law, the question arises as to whether he can partially avoid the operation of this rule by providing that he shall not be bound by any information acquired by his agent unless that information be communicated in a specified manner. Various methods are employed to accomplish this result. The provision most frequently encountered is a stipulation that no statement or representation made to the person soliciting
the application for the policy shall be binding on the company, or in
any manner affect its rights, unless reduced to writing in the application. See Schuler v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 191 Mo. App. 52, 176
S. W. 274 (1915). Whether this limitation is binding or not has been
the subject of conflicting decisions. It has been held invalid on the
ground that whether an agency exists for a particular purpose is to be
determined by settled legal principles rather than by a stipulation inserted by one seeking to avoid liability as a principal. Mutual Aid
Union v. Blacknall, 129 Ark. 450, 196 S. W. 792 (1917); Byrd v.
Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 73 Cal. App. (2d) 457, 166
P. (2d) 901 (1946); Hart v. Prudential Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. (2d)
298, 117 P. (2d) 930 (1941); Stillson v. PrudentialIns. Co. of America,
202 Ga. 79, 42 S. E. (2d) 121 (1947); Despain v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 81 Kan. 722, 106 Pac. 1027 (1910); Oredson v. Woodman of World
Life Ins. Soc., 211 Minn. 442, 1 N. W. (2d) 413 (1941); Stubbins v.
State Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., 229 S. W. 407 (Mo. App. 1921);
Deitz v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 31 W. Va. 851, 8 S. E. 616
(1888). On the other hand there are a substantial number of cases
which support the principle that an insurer may, through limitations
upon the authority of its agent brought to the attention of the insured,
be permitted to disclaim responsibility for errors of the agent in recording the answers of the insured in the application. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Moore, 231 U. S. 543, 34 S. Ct. 186, 58 L. Ed. 356 (1913); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519, 6 S. Ct. 837, 29 L. Ed. 934
(1886); United States Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 92 Fed. 503 (6th Cir.
1899); Curry v. Washington National Ins. Co., 56 Ga. App. 809, 194
S. E. 825 (1937); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Coddington, 131 N. J.
Eq. 430, 26 A. (2d) 41 (1942); Bernard v. United Life Ins. Ass'n, 14
App. Div. 142, 43 N. Y. Supp. 527 (1st Dep't 1897); Kasmer v. MetroPolitan Life Ins. Co., 140 Pa. Super. 46, 12 A. (2d) 805 (1940).
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The Fletcher case, supra, the leading authority for the latter view,
proceeds upon the assumption that the insurer had no knowledge of the
answers given by the insured, and that it had every reason to believe
that it was contracting upon representations substantially different; the
insured, therefore, had no right, to treat the contract as based on the
unknown rather than the known representations. In contemplation of
law, these assumed facts do not and cannot exist. Rather, a principal
may be ignorant of every act done, every representation made, and
every fact known by his agent and still be held liable. It is against
sound public policy to permit a principal who has delegated authority
to an agent of his own choosing to stipulate against the usual consequences of the relationship. If an insurance company can stipulate
against every fact learned by its agent, not communicated to it, so may
any other principal; and if immunity may be secured from the operation of this principle of the law of agency, it may, in the same mode
and with equal propriety, be secured against all other portions of the
law of agency from which, in the contemplation of the principal, it may
be profitable to be free. See Note, 9 Am. St. Rep. 229 (1888).
Another method employed by the insurer to evade the rule of imputed knowledge is by a provision inserted in the policy that the person taking the application should be regarded as the agent of the insured. 2 JoYcE, THE LAw OF INSUPANCE § 508 (2d ed. 1917). Though
some courts felt bound to enforce this limitation on the principle of freedom of contract, Rohrbach v. The Germania Fire Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 47
(1875), other courts have held it invalid; mere words could not be
substituted for that which was already a fact. Kansel v. Minnesota
Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Ass'n, 31 Minn. 17, 16 N. W. 430 (1883).
In the Kansel case it was also determined that notice should have been
given in the application for the policy stipulation to become binding on
the insured. Other courts have stated that this stipulation was not
merely a restriction of power, but actually a dissolution of one agency
and the attempted establishment of another between different parties.
See, Supreme Lodge, K. P. v. Withers, 177 U. S. 260, 20 S. Ct. 611,
44 L. Ed. 762 (1900).
To avoid the objection of lack of notice in the application raised in
the Kansel case, the insurer placed a stipulation in the application that
the person filling it out should be deemed the agent of the insured. Some
courts have upheld this stipulation on the theory of freedom of contract. This provision, according to these courts, contravened no sound
principle of public policy. See e.g., Dimick v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 69 N. J. L. 384, 55 At. 291 (1903). But courts have also denied
this stipulation's validity and determined that a well established relation cannot be abrogated by the ingenious use of words. Continental
Ins. Co. of New York v. Pierce, 39 Kan. 396, 18 Pac. 291 (1888). See
also, Deitz v. Providence WashingtonIns. Co., supra.
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As the principles above are based upon the premise that the false
answers are made by the agent of the insurer and not by an agent of
the insured, it has been expressly held that, notwithstanding the fact
that the statements contained in the application are warranties, their
effect, so far as the insured is concerned, is a nullity. Parno v. Iowa
Merchants' Mutual Ins. Co., 114 Iowa 132, 86 N. W. 210 (1901);
Hoffman et al. v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 274 Pa. 292, 117 Atl. 917
(1922). Further, the insured is not bound by false statements of the
agent in the application, whether made in his presence or not, since the
applicant answered the statements truthfully. Even though he failed
to read the application, he could rely on the agent to properly prepare
the application. Andrews v. Bulldog Auto Fire Ins. Ass'n of Chicago,
258 Mo. 714, 291 S. W. 508 (1926).
In some states the legislature has intervened and enacted statutes
making any person, other than the applicant, who solicits, procures, or
transmits an application for insurance the agent of the company. See,
e.g., OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 9586 (1938). Under this type of statute,
it has been held that the act of soliciting applications for insurance and
filling them in by an agent is the act of the company itself, even though
the application contained an express provision to the contrary. Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Chamberlain,132 U. S. 304, 10 S. Ct. 87, 33 L.
Ed. 341 (1889). See also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 77 Fed.
94 (8th Cir. 1896).
In appraising the relative claims of the insured, who is setting up
the fraud of the insurer's agent, and the insurer, who is relying on the
passive negligence of the insured, the Kansas Court in Pfiester v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 85 Kan. 97, 116 Pac. 245, 247 (1911), very
appropriately stated:
Few persons solicited to take policies understand the subject of insurance or the rules of law governing the negotiations, and they have no voice
in dictating the terms of what is called the' contract ....
In writing the
application, the agent does what the company sent him out to do. He
negotiates for the company, asks questions for the company, writes down
answers for the company.... It is not carelessness or imprudence in fact,
as people in general understand those terms, for the applicant to take it
for granted that the agent will accurately and truthfully set down the result of the negotiations. If he fail to do so, good sense and common
justice regard the company as responsible, and not the insurer [insured].
The subject, therefore, is sui generis, and the rules of a legal system devised to govern the formation of ordinary contracts between man and
man cannot be mechanically applied to it.

Some courts have failed to recognize the distinctive character of insurance contracts and have created a division of authority in applying
well-settled legal principles to them. In Griego v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 44 N. M. 330, 102 P. (2d) 31, 37 (1940), the court recognizing
this problem stated:
This glaring inconsistency of authority upon the question before us
rests upon the one single issue, viz., whether an insurance policy or a
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contract therefore, is not so distinctive in the field of commercial intercourse that a somewhat different rule from that which governs contracts
and agency generally, governs.

There is much to be said for this realistic view; the uniqueness of
insurance contracts and their tremendous economic importance are
readily discernible. The true issue is whether the active fraud of the
agent in supplying false answers in the application, outweighs the merely negligent omission of the insured to discover the fraud by failing to
read the application after the agent has completed it. However, the
insurance company should not be allowed to say to the insured, as held
in the instant case, and as stated in Griego v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
supra, 102 P. (2d) at 38:
You have misplaced your trust in our (the company's) agent, and,
while we will escape the disappointments and losses occasioned thereby,
you cannot. Your assumption that we would have in our employ only
such agents as are trustworthy and honest is incorrect as we must now for
the first time advise you.

Louis J. Mustico

LEGISLATION-BARRING or
SCHOOL SYsTEm.-Tkompson

SUBVERSIVE

PERSONS

FROM

PUBLIC

et al. v. Wallin et al.; L'Hommedieu
et al. v. Board of Regents of University of New York et al.; Lederman
et al. v. Board of Education of City of New York, -__.N. Y ..... 95 N. E.
(2d) 806 (1950). The actions were brought to enjoin enforcement of
and to have declared unconstitutional the Feinberg Law, N. Y. EDUCATION LAW § 3022, which provided that membership in subversive organizations should be prima facie evidence of disqualification for appointment or retention in the public school system of the state.
In 1917 the New York legislature enacted N. Y. EDUCATION LAW
§ 3021, which provided that:
A person employed as a superintendent of schools, teacher or employee
in the public schools, in any city or school district of the state, shall be
removed from such position for the utterance of any treasonable or seditious word or words or the doing of any treasonable or seditious act or
acts while holding such position.

In 1939, the N. Y. CIVIL SERVICE LAW § 12-a, was enacted, providing that any person employed in any of the public schools of New
York should be dismissed from employment if such person advocated,
advised or taught the doctrine that the Government of the United
States or of any state should be overthrown by force, violence or any
unlawful means.
Ten years later Section 3022 of the N. Y. EDUCATION LAW was
added. This section provides for the dismissal of subversive persons
from the public school system. The Act gave the Board of Regents,
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the governing body of the state's public schools, the power to adopt
and enforce rules and regulations for the disqualification or removal of
superintendents of schools, teachers, or employees in the public schools
who violate N. Y. EDUCATION LAW § 3021, supra, or who are ineligible
for appointment to or retention in any position in the public schools
on any of the grounds set forth in N. Y. CIVIL SERVICE LAW § 12-a,
supra. The Board of Regents also was given the authority to make
a listing of organizations, after inquiry and hearing, which it found to
be subversive. This Act was attacked by the plaintiffs on the grounds
that it was a violation of the Constitutions of the United States and of
New York in that it deprived the teachers of freedom of speech and
press, that it was an arbitrary exercise of the police power of the
state, and that it was a bill of attainder. The Court of Appeals held
that the Feinberg Law was not an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of
the state police power, was not a bill of attainder, nor an unwarranted
infringement of any constitutional right of free speech, assembly, or
association. The court further held that the legislature had the right
to eliminate subversives from its public school system upon the finding
of a necessity for their elimination, and that the legislature had the
power to provide the reasonable means for doing so. Without deciding
the wisdom, it found the means reasonable.
In making this determination the court relied heavily on the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in American Communications Ass'n, C. 1. 0. et al. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 400 S. Ct. 674, 94
L. Ed. 926 (1949); Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct.
247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919); and a former decision of the Court of
Appeals of New York, People v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694
(1933). These cases enunciated the doctrine that where the legislature has found a situation which requires remedial measures, and in
pursuance of this finding has enacted the necessary remedy the courts
may not substitute their judgment for that of the legislature as to the
expediency and wisdom of the legislation. To do so would be to transcend the limits of the field of inquiry permitted the courts. The only
time the courts may question legislation is when it clearly invades some
constitutional safeguard.
In reliance upon this doctrine legislatures in other states have found
the same need for anti-subversive legislation to prevent the infiltration
of subversives into their public school systems. The means used to
prevent infiltration varies. Some states merely require an affirmative
oath by the public school employees to support the Constitutions of the
United States and of the state. Others in addition to the affirmative
oath, require that the public school employee also take a negative oath
by which he denies membership in any subversive organization or that
he gives allegiance to any foreign country. A third group makes membership in a subversive organization a criminal offense punishable by
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fine and/or imprisonment. A fourth group contents itself with a
statutory provision barring members of subversive organizations from
employment in the public schools. A large number of states have not,
as yet, enacted legislation to meet the problem.
Although all public school anti-subversive legislation thus far enacted falls into one of these categories, there is substantial variation
within each group. Arizona is a state in the first group that requires
an affirmative oath only. Amz. CODE ANN. § 54-1002 (1939), provides that all teachers employed in the public schools of that state
must take the oath prescribed in ARIz. CODE ANN. § 2-301 (1939). The
tenor of this oath is that the teacher will support the Constitutions of
the United States and of Arizona, and that he will bear faith and allegiance to them. This is the same oath prescribed for all public officials
of that state.
Michigan has a similar statute, MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 15.701 (Cum.
Supp. 1949), as does Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAWS. c. 71, § 30A
(1945). The Massachusetts Act has an interesting addition which provides:
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to interfere in any way
with the basic principle of the constitution which assures every citizen
freedom of thought and speech and the right to advocate changes and improvements in both the state and federal constitutions.

The provisions of this Act have not yet been the subject of litigation.
However, the above quoted provision apparently prescribes a rule of
construction rather than a limitation upon the oath requirement.
A second group of states apparently felt that it was necessary to
create more exhaustive protection and require public school employees
to take a negative oath in addition to the affirmative one. The New
Jersey enactment exemplifies this group. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 18:13-9.1
(Cum. Supp. 1950), requires that all teachers take an oath of allegiance before being permitted to teach. The required oath is to be found
in N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 41:1-1 et seq. (Cum. Supp.1950), in which the
person taking it swears to defend this country against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that he does not advocate the overthrow of the
Government of the United States or New Jersey by force, violence or
unlawful means; that he belongs to no organization or society which
advocates that objective; and that he is not bound to any foreign sovereignty. This statute enumerates those to whom it is to be applied,
listing in addition to teachers, the governor, senators, and members of
the General Assembly. The case of Imbrie et al. v. Marsh et al., 5 N.
J. Super. 239, 68 A. (2d) 761 (1949), affid, 3 N. J. 578, 71 A. (2d)
352 (1950), held that the oath did not apply to the governor, senators,
or members of the General Assembly because it was a qualification of
the constitutional oath required to be taken by them; but as to the
others listed, including teachers, the oath was constitutional.
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Maryland has enacted legislation very similar to New Jersey. MD.
LAws, c. 86 (1949), requires that every employee of the state or of its
subdivisions is required to execute a written statement that he is not a
subversive person as defined in the Act. This Act does not require an
affirmative oath by the employee to support the Constitution of the
United States and of Maryland. In the case of Shub et al. v. Simpson,
---Md...... , 76 A. (2d) 332 (1950), that portion of the Maryland
statute which requires candidates for state office to file an anti-subversive affidavit along with his candidacy papers was held to be constitutional as a valid exercise of the state's police power. However, it
was held that this did not apply to candidates for federal office. This
statute has a provision which exceeds those of the New Jersey statute,
in that it is made a statutory felony for any person after June 1, 1949,
to become, or after September 1, 1949, to remain a member of a subversive organization, with knowledge that the organization is subversive. Any person convicted under these provisions would be barred
from any public employment. The Act further stipulates that reasonable grounds of belief that an employee is a subversive is grounds for
immediate discharge. This legislation also applies to private institutions of learning which wish to qualify for state aid. A private institution must, before receiving state aid, file a written report with designated state officials setting forth what procedures it has adopted to
discover subversive persons in its employ, and what steps are being taken
to terminate their employment.
Dworken v. Cleveland Board of Education,-.-- Ohio St ..... 94 N. E.
(2d) 18 (1950), presents an example of the litigation arising from this
class of legislation. In this case there was no statute involved, but a
resolution passed by the Cleveland Board of Education, requiring all
new employees, and requesting all present employees, of the Cleveland
School District to execute an oath that such employee is not a Communist or a member of any organization advocating seditious practices or the overthrow of the Government of the United States. The
Board had the authority to pass the resolution, as a part of its statutory powers and duties. Plaintiff, not a school teacher, sought an injunction against the Board to prevent them from enforcing the resolution, alleging grounds of unconstitutionality practically identical with
those claimed in the instant case. The relief was denied, the court
making the interesting observation, 94 N. E. (2d) at 32:
Some of the opponents of the anti-Communist oath have contended
that it is unnecessary in the educational field. Should it later develop
that it here was unnecessary then no harm will have been done.

The fact that the required oath was prescribed by the Cleveland Board
of Education may be an indication that the legislature of Ohio has decided to leave it to the individual school boards to determine the necessity in their own districts for anti-subversive oaths.
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Alabama has enacted the third type of legislation. There it is a
criminal offense to advocate the overthrow of the government of the
United States or of Alabama, or to be a member of any organization
which advocates their overthrow, ALA. CODE. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 22(1) et
seq. (Cum. Supp. 1947). Another state with a similar enactment is
Arkansas. This state forbids any person from membership in any organization or political party which advocates the overthrow of the present constitutional form of government. ARx. DIG. STAT. § 3-1404
(1947). In addition, Anx. DIG. STAT. § 41-4113 (1947), provides
that any member of a Nazi, Fascist, or Communist society or affiliated
organization shall not be eligible for employment by the State of Arkansas, or by any of its subdivisions.
The Pennsylvania statute typifies the fourth category. This enactment makes it grounds for dismissal for a public school teacher to be
a member of a subversive organizafion. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1122
(1949), lists as one of the grounds for the termination of a teacher's
contract advocation of or participation in un-American or subversive
doctrines. In addition, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 152 (Cum. Supp.
1950), provides for dismissal of any employee of any agency created
or supported in whole or in part by state funds, who advocates subversive doctrines as defined by the Act. This section specifically mentions employees of school districts. The case of Pawell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 146 Pa. Super. 147, 22 A. (2d)
43 (1941), upheld the constitutionality of this Act, although it should
be noted that the case did not involve a school teacher, but a state civil
service employee.
Texas has adopted this type of sanction. With respect to teachers
in the tax supported public schools of Texas, TEx. STAT., REv. Civ. art.
2908a (1948), states that it shall be grounds for dismissal for any
teacher to be found guilty of openly advocating doctrines which seek
to undermine or overthrow by force the Government of the United
States; or who in any way seeks to establish a government that does
not rest upon the fundamental principle of the consent of the governed.
As to employees of state-supported colleges or universities, Texas requires both the affirmative and negative oaths exemplified in the second
class of legislation. This Act, TEx. STAT., Rxv. Crv. art. 2908b (Supp.
1950), also requires that the oath be taken by all students before they
are allowed to register in any state-supported college or university.
The various statutory provisions discussed typify the categories of
legislative attempts to eliminate subversive elements from the public
school systems. It is notable that no other state has gone as far as
New York in attempting to solve the problem. The New York legislature, by placing in the hands of the Board of Regents the power to
determine which organizations ate subversive, and making membership
in such organizations prima facie evidence of disqualification for ap-
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pointment to or retention in any office or position in the public schools
of the state, has created a dangerous instrumentality which has the potentialities of becoming a political weapon for the suppression of unpopular doctrines. Those states which require their public school
teachers to take an affirmative oath to support the Constitutions of the
United States and the particular state have achieved a just and democratic means of effectuating their purpose. The means employed by the
other states, especially New York, are too dangerous, and are likely to
abuse personal constitutional rights. This author cannot concur in the
dictum, which is the thesis underlying this type of legislation, expressed
in Dworken v. Cleveland Board of Education, supra, that: "Should it
later prove that it . . . was unnecessary then no harm will have been
done."
Donald John Tufts

OIL AND GAS-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-STATE PRICE FIXING OF
WELLHEAD GAS TO PREVENT ECONOMIC WAsTE.-Cities Service Gas
Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas Co. et al., 340 U. S...... , 71 S. Ct. 215, 95

L. Ed ._ (1950); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma et al., 340 U.
S ..... , 71 S. Ct. 221, 95 L. Ed-... (1950). Oklahoma's Corporation
Commission ordered the appellants, Cities Service and Phillips, to establish minimum wellhead prices on all natural gas taken from the
Guymon-Hugoton Field and the Commission's action was sustained
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. This was upheld in the instant
cases by the Supreme Court. With the exception of the method of
contesting the authority of the Corporation Commission, the two cases
are similar. The main issue, posed in the Cities Service decision, was:
may a state fix prices at the wellhead on natural gas produced within
its borders but sold in interstate commerce?
Peerless, an independent producer, having no pipe outlet, offered
to sell the potential output of its wells to Cities Service. When the
parties were unable to reach an agreement, Peerless requested the
Corporation Commission to order Cities to make a connection with a
Peerless well and purchase the output of that well ratably at a price
fixed by the Commission, and to fix the price to be paid by all purchasers of natural gas from the field. Phillips contested the latter portion of the request, for it had its own gathering system and did not
purchase from other producers. A hearing was conducted by the commission, to which all producers were invited, and on the basis of the
testimony the commission concluded that the taking of the gas at the
then prevailing prices resulted in both economic and physical waste of
gas, loss to the state in gross production taxes, inequitable taking of
gas from the common source of supply, and discrimination against va-
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rious producers in the field. Concluding that the Peerless requests were
reasonable and necessary the commission issued the minimum price
order. Appellants reached the United States Supreme Court on the
issues of due process, equal protection, unlawful price fixing, and interference with federal authority to regulate interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court quickly disposed of the due process and equal
protection contentions by reference to legislation designed to curb waste
of natural resources through ratable taking. Champlin Refining Company v. CorporationCommission, 286 U. S.210, 52 S.Ct. 559, 76 L. Ed.
1062 (1932). Another ground obviating the Court's necessity for discussing due process and equal protection is the power of the state to
protect its economy. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan &
Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S.573, 60 S. Ct. 1021, 84 L. Ed. 1368 (1940).
Since 1934 price fixing substantially related to a legitimate end
sought to be attained has been upheld as valid. Nebbia v. New York,
291 U. S.502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934). It should be noted,
however, that price fixing per se was not one of the specific powers delegated to the Corporation Commission by the Oklahoma Legislature.
OIKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 23-5, §§ 231-2 (1941). Impliedly the
Oklahoma statute gives the commission such power where there is a
common source of supply or a common purchaser. Under Section 239
the commission may limit the amount of gas taken by a producer to
"such proportion of the natural gas that may be marketed without
waste."

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 239-40 (1941).

Thus, Okla-

homa, with excellent natural gas provisions, may be classed with the
great majority of gas producing states who have no actual price fixing
provisos. Other gas producing states are in accord with the Oklahoma
law and merely infer that their regulatory bodies have price fixing
powers. See ARK. DIG. STAT. § 53-111 (1948); CoLO. STAT. ANN. c.
118, § 66 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-701 et seq. (1935);
N. M. STAT. ANN.§ 69-211 (1941); Miss. CODE. ANN.§ 6132-01 et
seq. (Supp. 1950); TEx REv.Civ. STAT. ANN.art. 6008 et seq. (1948).
Apparently Michigan stands alone by having enunciated specific authority in 1937, MicH. STAT. ANN. § 13.138(28) (Cum. Supp. 1949).

In the main, the interstate commerce question presented the pivotal
issue. Justice Clark, writing the opinion, said, 71 S.Ct. at 219:
The Commerce Clause gives to the Congress a power over interstate
commerce which is both paramount and broad in scope. But due regard
for state legislative functions has long required that this power be treated as not exclusive.

Some of the arguments posed by the successful counsel in the
Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, 13
L. Ed. 996, 999 (U. S.1851), decision certainly appear applicable to the
case under consideration. In the Cooley decision the counsel contended
that:
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The Act in question is no regulation of commerce. It was passed in
the exercise of a power of the State not granted or surrendered. . . . It
is local in character and object, an essential exercise of one branch of
the police power of the State, to aid, and not to regulate commerce ...
Even if it be a regulation of commerce, the power of Congress is not
exclusive.

Since the Cooley decision was cited by Mr. Justice Clark as authority
it would appear that the arguments posed therein are valid.
A problem somewhat similar to that of the instant case was presented in Milk Control Board of Pennsylvania v. Eisenberg Farm
Products, 306 U. S. 346, 59 S. Ct. 528, 83 L. Ed. 752 (1939), in which
the State of Pennsylvania required milk dealers to pay producers at
least the minimum prices prescribed by a state administrative agency.
Eisenberg, a dealer, bought milk from one hundred and seventy-five
farmers in the neighborhood and after retention for less than twentyfour hours, shipped all of the milk to New York City. The Supreme
Court held that "the effect of the law on interstate commerce is incidental and not forbidden by the Constitution, in the absence of regulation by Congress." 306 U. S. at 353. Here, as in the Eisenberg case,
there was no inherent discrimination against interstate commerce, for
the Oklahoma commission's order was issued primarily for the purpose
of preventing waste and sustaining the state's natural gas conservation
program.
Since the Natural Gas Act, 52 STAT. 821 et seq. (1938), 15 U. S. C.
§§ 717 et seq. (1946), is concerned particularly with the control of
interstate transportation and sale for resale of natural gas, leaving a
middle ground bounded by production and gathering at one end and
by local distribution at the other, it is patent why the appellants did
not assert that the Oklahoma Corporation Commission invaded the
jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission. It was explicitly stated
that the Oklahoma commission's prime concern was the waste in the
Hugoton Field, thereby limiting itself to the production and gathering
phase, though undoubtedly interstate commerce was affected because
of the large amount of gas that was piped into neighboring states.
Though the Court was not faced with the jurisdictional conflict of
the Federal Power Commission vis-a-vis a state regulatory body, the
Kansas Supreme Court conclusively met such a problem two months
before the interstate commerce question was raised in the United States
Supreme Court. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission et al.; Panhandle EasternPipe Line Co. v. State Corporation Commission et al.; Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission et al., 169 Kan. 722, 222 P. (2d) 704 (1950). In
the Kansas decision the appellant gas companies, in litigation over
Kansas price fixing for the Kansas area of the Hugoton Field, contended that the Kansas Corporation Commission had no authority to determine wellhead gas prices, for that would constitute an invasion of
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the domain of the Federal Power Commission. However, the court
held that producing and gathering was without the cognizance of the
FPC and that the action of the Corporation Commission was a reasonable one, within the power entrusted to it by the Kansas legislature.
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-701 et seq. (1935).
The Kansas Court
felt that the jurisdictional issue anent the Natural Gas Act was resolved by the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
where it was held that the transfer of gas leases was not within the
control of the FPC. FederalPower Commission v. PanhandleEastern
Pipe Line Co., 172 F. (2d) 57, 58 (3d Cir. 1949), aff'd, 337 U. S. 498,
69 S. Ct. 1251, 93 L. Ed. 1499 (1949). The Kansas Court also referred to the actual wording of the Natural Gas Act, which reads 52
STAT. 822 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 717(b) (1946):
...
but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural
gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for
such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.

The reasoning of the Kansas Court was further augmented by the
views of two of the Federal Power Commission members, who believed
that production and gathering includes the operations by which gas is
withdrawn from the earth, processed and brought by feeding lines from
the field to central points of connection with transmission systems. See
FPC, NATURAL GAS INVESTIGATION (Smith-Wimberly Report) 108
(1948).
It should be noted that the Kansas Court could have alluded to the
intent of Congress when the Natural Gas Act was presented for consideration. The purpose was "to fill the gap in regulation that . . .
exist[ed] by reason of the lack of authority of the State commissions."
H. R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937).
In view of an earlier Kansas State Corporation Commission determination that it had power to fix a minimum price for wellhead gas,
where the Commission stated, In re Hugoton Gas Field, 77 P. U. R. (N.
S.) 150,158 (1949):
We are of the opinion that this Commission has jurisdiction and
authority to establish a minimum fixed price at the wellhead in this field
when fixing a minimum price is necessary or appropriate regulatory means
of giving effect to the intent and purpose of the statute relating to the
production and conservation of natural gas.

it is apparent that Kansas may be classed as one of the articulate and
forthright proponents of state regulatory powers in the field of natural
gas conservation.
Comparing the United States and Kansas Supreme Court decisions,
the specific issue of wellhead gas price fixing seems rather conclusively
settled. On the one hand, price fixing is permissible in the interest of
conservation where Congress has not exercised jurisdiction, though a
major portion of the gas may be piped interstate. See Cooley v. Board
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of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, supra; Milk Control Board of
Pennsylvania v. Eisenberg Farm Products, supra. On the other hand,
price fixing of gas that is largely destined for interstate traffic is said to
be a state matter and valid because it does not contravene Section 717
(b) of the Natural Gas Act, the purpose of which is primarily one of
aiding and filling the gap where state commissions are powerless or
ineffective.
Thus, the federal and state courts have paid heed to the intent
of Congress, though legislative measures to preclude such controversies
failed to become law because of a presidential veto. (See H. R. 1758
and S. 1498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., bill to insure immunity of natural
gas producers and gatherers from federal regulation; and H. R. 4001,
H. R. 4028, and S. 1831, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., bills to exempt certain
local retail and wholesale distributors from federal control.)
Reading the Michigan statute giving detailed price fixing authority,
the Kansas Corporation Commission's determination, and the United
States and Kansas Supreme Court decisions, pari materia, it should be
readily discernible that the states have not forsaken their regulatory
powers in the field of natural gas. It is difficult to ascertain what legal
basis remains for natural gas producers to use in remonstrating about
state conservation regulatory authority, in the delimitated phase of
wellhead gas price fixing. Natural gas producers should note well the
emphasis placed on the state power of conservation by the Supreme
Court.
henry M. Shine, Jr.

TAXATION-FEDERAL GIFT TAXES-PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH SuRVivEs DIVORCE DEcREE-DISCREPANCIES IN VALUE

TAx.-Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U. S...... , 71 S. Ct. 181, 95 L. Ed ._ (1950). In contemplation of obtaining a divorce, the petitioner and her husband reached a settlement of their intangled property interests. It was found
that the value of the property transferred to the husband exceeded that
received by the petitioner by some $107,150.00. The Commissioner
assessed a gift tax on the basis of INT. REV. CODE § 1002:
OF PROPERTY EXCHANGED NOT SUBJECT TO GIFT

Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by which the
value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration, shall, for the
purpose of the tax imposed by this chapter, be deemed a gift. ...

Transfers pursuant to family settlements are classified as ante-nuptial
and post-nuptial transfers. The latter may be further subdivided into
transfers per an agreement incorporated into a divorce decree and those
independent of a divorce decree.
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Transfers made by a man to his intended wife in consideration of
the relinquishment by her of her prospective rights in his estate, or vice
versa, may be subject to the gift tax. Merrill v. Faks, 324 U. S. 308,
65 S. Ct. 655, 89 L. Ed. 963 (1945); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324
U. S. 303, 65 S. Ct. 652, 89 L. Ed. 958 (1945). The Supreme Court's
upholding the tax in these cases was predicated on the theory that the
ante-nuptial transfer in relinquishment of property rights was not an
"adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth," as required by Section 1002. In the Wemyss case a widow stood to lose
the income from a trust fund amounting to $5,484.00 annually if she
remarried, so her intended husband transferred a block of stock of value
in excess of $149,000.00 to her. Within a month they were married
and the Commissioner ruled the transfer taxable as a gift. The Supreme Court felt that Congress intended to use the term "gift" in its
broadest and most comprehensive sense, that the test of "donative intent" was abrogated by the test Congress laid down, that is, "adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth." The Merrill case,
on the other hand, was the relinquishment by the wife to be of all
marital rights against her future husband's estate, which was in excess
of five million dollars, except her right to maintainance and support.
In the suit for a refund of the gift tax imposed, Justice Frankfurter
turned to the "guiding light," as he aptly phrased it, found in Estate
of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 44, 60 S. Ct. 51, 84 L. Ed.
20 (1939), and declared: "The gift tax was supplementary to the
estate tax. The two are in pari materia and must be construed together." INT. REv. CODE § 812, as applied by the Court states in part:
The deduction herein allowed in the case of claims against the estate,
unpaid mortgages, or any indebtedness shall, when founded upon a promise
or agreement, be limited to the extent that they are contracted bona fide
and for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
• . . For the purpose of this subchapter, a relinquishment or promised
relinquishment of dower, curtesy or of statutory estate created in lieu
of dower or curtesy, or of other marital rights in the decedent's property
or estate, shall not be considered to any extent a consideration in money
or money's worth.
It follows, therefore, that if the transfer of property in relinquishment
of marital rights was not deductible upon the death of the transferor, it
likewise must be considered, for tax purposes, as a gift. In the case
at bar the Court reiterates the view that the gift and estate taxes must
be construed in parimateria.
The test applied in the Merrill case--"adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth"--has been extended by the courts to
transfers pursuant to post-nuptial family settlements with one exception:
transfers pursuant to an agreement incorporated in a divorce decree,
wherein the transfer is effected by the decree rather than by the promise or agreement. Harris v. Commissioner, supra; Estate of Josephine
F. Barnard, 176 F. (2d) 233 (2d Cir. 1949); Commissioner v. Con-
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verse, 163 F. (2d) 131 (2d Cir. 1947). See Krause v. Yoke, 89 F.
Supp. 91 (D. W. Va. 1950), for results of transfer made under agreement not judicially sanctioned by a decree until after the transfer. Also
in George J. McMurty, 16 T. C. No. 23 (Jan. 24, 1951), P-H 1951
FED. TAx REP. DEc. I 16.23, the effectiveness of the agreement was
in no way dependent upon the entry of a divorce decree; therefore the
gift tax was applied. However, these agreements not sanctioned by a
decree may still be exempt from the gift tax and are still governed by
E. T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. BuLL. 166, which provides: to the extent that a
transfer does not exceed the reasonable value of the support rights of
the wife, it is to be treated as made for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
In the Barnardcase the wife transferred to her husband $50,000.00
under a separation agreement incident to a divorce, and the transfer
was approved by the court granting the divorce. The husband's consideration for this transfer was the release of all rights in his wife's
estate. The transaction was not a gift so as to be subject to a gift
tax because the claims of the husband were unliquidated; hence, it was
assumed that she received her money's worth. Another reason the
courts have given for holding transfers of property pursuant to an
agreement incorporated into a divorce or separation decree not subject
to gift tax, is that if the judgment under the decree remains unsatisfied
until the taxpayer's death, its eventual payment becomes a deductible
claim in the estate tax computation, and, as always, the gift tax must
be construed in pari materia with the estate tax. If it is deductible
under the estate tax provisions it is not taxable under the gift tax
statute. Commissioner v. Converse, supra.
The Court, in the principal case, reiterated a third and still more
compelling reason for excluding transfers as these from the gift tax.
Reasoning that the estate and gift tax are construed together, and that
the estate tax allows deduction for any indebtedness when founded upon
a promise or agreement to the extent that they were contracted bona
fide and for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth, still in such a case as this, it is the decree that creates the rights
and the duties; not the agreement; and a decree certainly is not an
agreement or promise in any sense. Therefore the gift tax Ahould not
be applied.
Up to this point, the case under discussion falls into the transfers
made under an agreement incorporated in a divorce decree. This case,
however, is an extension of that doctrine. The agreement in question
contained an innocent clause which occasioned the split in the Supreme
Court over this case: "The covenants in this agreement shall survive
any decree of divorce which may be entered." Also, the decree stated:
"It is ordered that said agreement and said trust agreement forming
a part thereof shall survive this decree." In construing the effect of this
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stipulation in the agreement the Court said, 71 S. Ct. at 184, that, "the
gift tax statute is concerned with the source of rights, not with the manner in which rights at some distant times may be enforced." This was
in reply to an argument of Judge Learned Hand, who in this case below,
178 F. (2d) 861, 865 (2d Cir. 1949), sustained the Commissioner on the
basis that there were two sanctions for the transfer, contempt under
the decree and execution under the contract.
Assuming that the gift tax statute is concerned with the source of
right, does it necessarily follow that a condition precedent, in this case
the divorce decree, is the source of the right, or is it the agreement
which is the source? This is the issue upon which the disagreement
arises. Granting that "if the transfer is effected by court decree, 'no
promise or agreement' of the parties is the operative fact," there yet
remains the difficulty of determining just what is the operative fact in
an agreement which states, 71 S. Ct. at 187:
This agreement shall be submitted to the court for its approval, but
nevertheless the covenants in this agreement shall survive any decree of
divorce which may be entered. It is of the essence of this agreement
that the settlement herein provided for shall not become operative in any
manner nor shall any of the Recitals or covenants herein become binding
upon either party unless a decree of absolute divorce between the parties
shall be entered in the pending Nevada action. The parties hereto, however, shall proceed as expeditiously as possible to carry into effect the
covenants herein, which it is provided are to be performed by either of
the parties prior to the entry of the decree as aforesaid. [Emphasis supplied.]

Is the condition precedent to the existence of the contract the operative
fact or is the agreement itself the operative fact? Justice Frankfurter
in his dissenting opinion said, 71 S. Ct. at 188:
The fact that the undertakings defined by this agreement would come
into force only on the occurrence of a condition, to wit, the entering of a
divorce decree, is apparently regarded as decisive of taxability. But does
this make any real difference? . . . The condition on which an agreement comes into force does not supplant the agreement any more than a
deed in escrow ceases to be a deed when it comes out of escrow.

To repeat what Judge Learned Hand said in sustaining the Commissioner in the court below, the transfers were founded not only on
the decree but upon both the decree and a "promise or agreement." 178
F. (2d) at 865. Even though a divorce decree directs different payments than those specified in the agreement, if the agreement is construed to survive the decree, an action may be brought on the agreement. Seuss v. Schukat, 358 Ill. 27, 192 N. E. 668 (1934); Freeman
v. Sieve, 323 Mass. 652, 84 N. E. (2d) 16 (1949); Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. (2d) 265 (1940).
Are the federal estate and gift tax truly construed in pari materia
in this case, as claimed by the majority? Under the federal estate tax,
even a judgment obtained on a promise given for inadequate consider-
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ation is not deductible from the gross estate. Markwell's Estate v.
Commissioner, 112 F. (2d) 253 (7th Cir. 1940).
This exception in favor of transfer pursuant to an agreement incorporated into a divorce decree is an unwarranted discrimination in favor
of divorce settlements as contrasted with ante-nuptial arrangements.
Regardless of the propriety of the existence of such an exception it is
imperative that practicing attorneys realize the full import of this decision. From all appearances, the instant case indicates that the Court
has a very strong tendency to hold any transfer of property pursuant
to an agreement that is incorporated in a divorce decree, whether or
not the agreement survives the decree, as not subject to the federal gift
tax regardless of the rights surrendered by the agreement and regardless of the excessive value of the property transferred over the value of
the rights surrendered.
Arthur L. Beaudette

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY

FOR DAMAGE DUE

To BLASTING,

-Reynolds et al. v. W. H. Hinman Co.. .... Me ..... 75 A. (2d) 801
(1950). The complaint alleged that the defendant, a highway construction company, while engaged in blasting, caused severe damage to
the property of the plaintiffs by the resulting vibrations and concussions. The plaintiffs relied for the most part upon the rule of strict
liability, maintaining that persons engaged in blasting are insurers
against resulting injuries even in the absence of fault. In affirming the
decision of the trial court where the defendant's demurrer was sustained,
the court held that fault is a requisite for liability in a negligence case,
and therefore, if an act is lawful, properly conducted, and is a reasonable use of one's property, no liability is incurred without fault.
The issue raised in the case is one of the most controversial in the
law of torts,-the test of liability to be applied to one lawfully engaged
in perilous and dangerous activities. With regard to blasting there are
three distinct theories extant in the United States. One view applies
the doctrine of absolute liability to all cases in which the injury is
proximately caused by the blasting. This doctrine was first laid down
in the famous English case of Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 3 H. L. 330,
339-40 (1868), where the court held:
... the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his lands and dollects
and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep
it in at his peril; and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable
for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He
can excuse himself by shewing that the escape was owing to the Plaintiff's
default; or perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major,
or the act of God. ...
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Although the rule of Fletcher v. Rylands has not been followed in
America to the full extent of its implications, yet in numerous blasting
cases it has been applied in principle if not in fact. This rule as applied
to blasting was aptly stated in Richard v. Kaufman et al., 47 F. Supp.
337, 338 (E. D. Pa. 1942), where the court held that blasting was an
ultra hiazardous activity for which the person engaged in it is liable
for damages proximately caused thereby, even in the absence of fault
or negligence and regardless of whether the damage was caused by
flying debris or concussion. Among the numerous decisions in accord
with this rule are: Exner et ux. v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.
(2d) 510, (2d Cir. 1931); Watson v. Mississippi River Power Co., 174
Iowa 23, 156 N. W. 188 (1916); Stocker v. Richmond Heights, 235
Mo. App. 277, 132 S. W. (2d) 1116 (1930); Louden v. Cincinnati
et al., 90 Ohio 144, 106 N. E. 970 (1914); Baier et ux. v. Glen Alden
Coal Co., 131 Pa. Super. 309, 200 Atl. 190, aff'd, 332 Pa. 561, 3 A. (2d)
349 (1938); Jones v. Oman et al., 28 Tenn. App. 1, 184 S. W. (2d)
568 (1944) (defendant held to insurer's liability).
The second view attempts to distinguish the manner by which the
damage was caused. If the injury was the direct result of debris being
thrown onto the person or property of another the correct action is
trespass, whereas case is the action for injuries resulting from concussion and vibration, such damage being considered consequential. Though
the forms of action no longer control, the distinction is maintained to
determine the test to be applied. In Jenkins et al. v. A. G. Tomasello
& Son, Inc. et al., 286 Mass. 180, 189 N. E. 817, 820 (1934), it was
held that by the common law, a blaster was liable for all direct injuries to the person or property of another, but that without negligence
fie was not liable for harm caused by concussion. Similarly, in an
action for damages caused by incidental jarring, the New York Court
of Appeals, in Booth v. Rome W. & 0. T. R. R., 140 N. Y. 267, 35 N.
E. 592, 593 (1893), said that mere proof of damage by blasting would
not sustain the action The plaintiff must further show the violation
of a duty owing to him by the defendant or a failure to use due care.
Bacon v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 109 Kan. 234, 198 Pac. 942
(1921); Campbell et al. v. Adams et al., 228 Ky. 156, 14 S. W. (2d)
418 (1929); Dolham et ux. v. Peterson, 297 Mass. 479, 9 N. E. (2d)
406 (1937); Lewis et al. v. Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co., 178
Misc. 980, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 897 (S. Ct. 1942); Universal Atlas Cement
Co. v. Oswald et al., 138 Tex. 159, 157 S. W. (2d) 636 (1941).
The third view appears to be more in accord with the general rule
that tort liability must be predicated upon fault. In the principle case,
the court, basing its decision upon this theory, supported its position
by Chickering v. Lincoln County Power Co., 118 Me. 414, 108 Adt.
460, 461 (1919), where this rule was stated:
When a person attempts to do that which is useful, usual, or necessary,
as well as lawful, if done under proper conditions, and injury unexpectedly
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results, ...
the question of whether he reasonably exercised that right
turns upon his negligence, within the latitude for discrimination or distinction which that form of action affords.

It is apparent, therefore, that the quesiton of whether the use of the
property of the defendant was reasonable or unreasonable has considerable bearing on the question of liability, particularly if the defendant
is engaged in a lawful act. One is entitled to the reasonable use of his
property even if the use incidentally injures another; but liability for
the injury will arise when such injury is caused by the unreasonable use
of property in a manner the user should have reasonably anticipated
would result in damage to another. B1utton v. Pennsylvania R. R., 11S
Ind. App. 210, 57 N. E. (2d) 444 (1944). Blasting is a lawful act,
Cary Bros. & Hannon v. Morrison, 129 Fed. 177 (8th Cir. 1904), and
a reasonable and necessary use of land. Georgia Granite Co. v. Simms,
11 Ga. App. 295, 75 S. E. 143 (1912); Cashin v. Northern Paiific
Ry., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P. (2d) 862 (1934); Arthur v. Henry et al.,
157 N. C. 393, 73 S. E. 206 (1911); McKay et ux. v. Kelly, 229 S.
W. (2d) 117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Standard Paving Co. v. McClinton, 146 S. W. (2d) 466 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). See also, Smith,
Liability for Substantial Physical Damage to Land by Blasting-The
Rule of the Future, 33 HARv. L. REv. 542 (1920), in which the author
urges the adoption of a rule predicating liability upon fault.
Though this latter view is a departure from absolute liability, modem public policy requires the courts to resort to it on many occasions.
The practical result of imposing absolute liability, as pointed out by
the court in Booth v. Rome, supra, would be too far reaching. If-sustained, it would impose a serious restriction upon the use of property
and greatly impair its value, would enable the first occupant to control
the use of adjoining property, and would prevent or tend to prevent
the improvement of property. But even then the court did not completely reject the doctrine, but merely limited it to instances where the
damage resulted from flying debris. Some writers maintain that these
distinctions are unwarranted. SALMOND, TORTS 231 (7th ed. 1928).
Others maintain that there is little or no reason for applying the doctrine of strict liability in cases involving bldsting damage. As pointed
out by Smith, supra, at 553, a plaintiff who has a plausible case by
present standards can generally recover without resorting to the rule
of absolute liability. Likewise, the present tendency of the courts is
to restrict the use of the doctrine to as few situations as possible. However, this does not eliminate the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher but
rather limits it to a more strict application.
This diversity of views is not without an historical significance. The
rule placing strict liability on persons engaged in blasting was well established. before the scope of the law of negligence had begun to be
realized. As it progressed, the changes in the prevailing law were
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made when necessitated by the circumstances. In Thayer, Liability
Without Fault, 29 HAnv. L. REv. 801, 805 (1916), the author states
that the law of negligence is so modem that the judges who sat in
Rylands v. Fletcher "had but an imperfect sense of its reach and power," and that in its present development it renders obsolete much that
went before it.
In general, the application of the rule of negligence to blasting has
resulted in a more uniform rule, unencumbered with numerous exceptions and untenable distinctions. In the principal case, the court refused to adopt a rule of absolute liability in a case of first impression
on concussion damages resulting from blasting operations. In doing so,
it lent its weight to the growing tendency in tort law to restrict liability
to the performance of culpable acts rather than imposing it for an
otherwise reasonable and lawful use of one's own property.
Luke R. Morin

TRADE REGuLATION-PRICE DISCRIMINATION-MEETING COMPETITION AS AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE UNDER ROBINSON-PATmAN

ACT.-

Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U. S ..... 71 S. Ct.
240, 95 L. Ed .... (1951). The petitioner was engaged in the business
of selling gasoline in interstate commerce. It sold to four large jobbers
in the Detroit area at a lower price per gallon than it did to its small
service station customers. One of these jobbers, through its own retail stations, was thereby enabled to sell its gasoline at a lower price
than the retail rate prevailing in the area. A cease and desist order
was issued against Standard Oil by the Federal Trade Commission on
the ground that the price differential given to the jobbers on the same
grade and quality of gasoline was a violation of Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1946). Standard Oil
contended that the price differentials were made in good faith to retain
the jobbers as customers by meeting the equally low price of a competitor. The commission ruled that even though the seller acted in
good faith to meet competition, that fact did not constitute an absolute defense because injury had resulted to competition at the lower
retail level. With a slight modification, the commission's determination
was affirmed by the court of appeals. Standard Oil Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 173 F. (2d) 210 (7th Cir. 1949). The Supreme
Court speaking through Justice Burton reversed the lower court in the
instant case and stated, 71 S. Ct. at 248:
...there has been widespread understanding that, under the RobinsonPatman Act, it is a complete defense to a charge of price discrimination

for. the seller to show that its price differential has been made in good
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faith to meet a lawful and equally low price of a competitor ....
no reason to depart now from that interpretation.

We see

The issue before the court was whether Section 2(b) constituted a
mere procedural rule fixing the burden of proof or was an absolute defense against the ciarge of unlawful discrimination in price. It was the
commission's contention that whenever injury resulted or might result to
competition at the buyer's resale level (here the retail level), Section
2 (b) would render the seller who gave a price differential liable for an
unlawful price discrimination.
In attempting to construe an ambiguous statute by reference to its
legislative history resort may be had to extrinsic aids. Sutherland
chronologically divides these aids as follows: (1) events prior to the
time of the statute's introduction in the legislature; (2) events from
the time of its introducti6n to its passage; (3) events after its enactment. 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5001 (3rd ed.
1943). In proceeding to answer the question proposed, this division
will be followed in this analysis.
The history of legislative events leading to the introduction of the
Robinson-Patman Act began in 1914. In that year the first federal
enactment against discriminatory price differentials was incorporated
in Section 2 of the Clayton Act. The intent and purpose of this act
was to prohibit those practices which unlawfully restrained trade and
fostered monopolies. Because of its broad language, this section proved
to be inadequate protection from the mischief at which it was aimed.
Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, SEN. Doc. No. 4, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1934). Prior to the enactment of the RobinsonPatman Act Section 2 of the Clayton Act provided:
. . . it shall be unlawful . . . to discriminate in price between different
purchasers ... where the effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition . . . Provided, that nothing herein contained shall
prevent . . . discrimination in price in the same or different communities
made in good faith to meet competition.

By this section a seller could establish an absolute defense against a
charge of unlawful price discrimination by showing that it was done in
good faith to meet competition. This exemption weakened the effectiveness of the Act because it tended "to substitute the remedy of retaliation for that of law." 80 CONG. REc. 3113 (1936). Another defect
lay in ihe fact that a large buyer could demand a preference by finding several sellers willing to sell at a lower price than that charged by
their competitors. H. R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
In order to remedy the weaknesses of Section 2, Congress amended
it by the Robinson-Patman Act. The passage of this Act was materially aided by the fears expressed in the congressional report, supra, on
chain store practices. Consequently, this amendment has been referred
to as the "anti-chain store law." McAllister, Price Control By Law in

RECENT DECISIONS
the United States: A Survey, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 273 (1937).

It is interesting to note that neither the original draft of the House nor
the Senate bill contained a section similar to Section 2(b). This
indicates that the legal temper of the times favored exclusion of
the meeting-of-competition exemption entirely. But after some discussion the present section was included. 80 CONG. REc. 3119 (1936).
The Act divided Section 2 of the Clayton Act into two paragraphs. The
first, Section 2(a), specifically enumerated the absolute defenses
against the charges of unlawful discrimination. The second paragraph,
Section 2(b), purportedly was intended as a mere rule of evidence to
be used in proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission. H. R.
On the other hand, it
REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
was also characterized as only "a contraction of an exemption . . .
contained in section 2 of the Clayton Act." H. R. REP. No. 2287, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1936).
Section 2 (b) of the Robinson-Patman Act provides:
Upon proof being made .

.

. that there has been discrimination in

price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima
fade case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person
charged with a violation of this section . .

.

Provided, however, That

nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima facie
case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of
services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good
faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor ....

From the language of this section it is seen that once the commission
has established jurisdiction over the cause and proves that there has
been a price differential made in interstate commerce, a prima facie
case of price discrimination is made out.

AUSTIN, PRICE DIscmniNA-

TION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT

82

(1950). The burden of proving that the differential was made in good
faith to meet the equally low price of a competitor then is upon the
seller. At this point it becomes important to determine whether Section 2(b) is a substantive defense or a mere procedural rule. If it is
a substantive defense, and the seller proves that he made the price
differential "in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor,"
he is absolved of any guilt. But, if it is merely a procedural rule, upon
a showing by the commission that injury has resulted to competition,
the seller is deemed to have violated the statute.
While admittedly there is confusion as to whether Section 2 (b) is
procedural or substantive, the following statement seems to dispel
doubt as to the intent of Congress. In the Conference Report to the
House, Congressman Utterback, Chairman of the House Conferees,
said, 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936):
...this does not set up the meeting of competition as an absolute bar
to a charge of discrimination under the bill. It merely permits it to
be shown in evidence. This provision is entirely procedural. It does not
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determine substantive rights, liabilities and duties. . . . If this proviso
were construed to permit the showing of a competing offer as an absolute
bar to liability for discrimination, then it would nullify the act entirely
at the very inception of its enforcement, for in nearly every case mass
buyers receive similar discriminations from competing sellers of the same
product. One violation of law dannot be permitted to justify another.

Thus, this section was not intended to be construed as a "justification"
or as an affirmative defense but was meant only to allow the seller to
overcome the presumption of injury to competition arising from the
Commission's showing of a discrimination. 80 CONG. REc. 10,017
(1936); AUSTIN, supra at 92. Conversely, one authority has stated that
the courts would probably construe this section to be an absolute defense in order to avoid the question of its constitutionality. He implies
that this section might have been struck down on the grounds that it
impairs the freedom to contract or that it deprives a person of property without due process of law. Gordon, Robinson-PatmanAnti-Discrimination Act-The Meaning of Sections 1 and 3, 22 A. B. A. J. 593
(1936).
Since the passage of the Act, it definitely appears that sentiment has
gone against the interpretation of Section 2(b) as a mere procedural
device. Some members of the Federal Trade Commission and of the
Department of Justice believed that this section should be treated as an
absolute defense. Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 236, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 66, 77 (1949); Hearings before Committee of the Judiciary on S. 1008, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 72 (1949). This same view was expressed in a recent article devoted to the problem. Berger and Goldstein, Meeting Competition
Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 44 ILL. L. REv. 315 (1949). While
this is the first case to deal specifically with the issue raised, the majority opinion cites two prior decisions as recognizing this section as an
absolute defense. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U. S. 726, 65 S. Ct. 961, 89 L. Ed. 1320 (1945); Federal
Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746, 65 S. Ct.
971, 89 L. Ed. 1338 (1945). In both cases it was held that the evidence was insufficient to show that the discrimination was made in
good faith to meet competition. Although the court was not called upon
to construe Section 2 (b), they inferred in the Staley case that it might
be an absolute defense had good faith been proven.
In spite of the legislative history of the measure, the Court in the
instant case proceeded to hold that a showing of good faith in an attempt to meet the lower price of a competitor exonerates the seller of
a charge of price discrimination. It characterized Section 2(b) in
these terms, 71 S. Ct. at 250:
the proviso is readily understandable as simply continuing in effect a
defense which is equally absolute but more limited in scope than that
which existed under § 2 of the original, Clayton Act.
...

RECENT DECISIONS
The Court gave two examples of the limitations on Section 2 (b). They
concluded that since reference to the "same or different communities"
phrase of the old section had been omitted in the present act, the paragraph was meant to apply only to price discriminations made in actual
competition. The second limitation prevents the seller from lowering
his price below that of his competitor; he may only meet the competitive price. The majority therefore concluded that the legislative purpose in subdividing the original section was not to deprive Section 2 (b)
of its status as a defense, but merely to limit its scope.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Supreme Court was more
intent on construing the section in the light of recent opinionated utterances, than in following the legislative intent. Under the guise of preserving competition, the Court has reopened the way for injurious practices. Whatever may be the economic arguments for or against the
Act, it seems that the Court has judicially reinstated a serious defect
of the original Clayton Act in most of its ramifications.
John F. Mendoza

TRUSTs-ALLOCATION BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND INCOME.-Wacho-

via Bank & Trust Co. et al. v. Grubb et al., ...
N. C......
62 S.E. (2d)
719 (1950). The testator devised and bequeathed to the petitioners,
in trust, all the residue of his estate, after the payment of debts, costs
of administration, and legacies. He directed that "the entire net income derived from my trust estate shall be paid ... after the expiration of three years from the date of my death.. ." to his widow and
other beneficiaries. The testator's widow claimed her ratable share of
the income earned from the residuary estate from the time of the death
of the testator. The legatees who were to share in the corpus of the
estate after the trust period terminated contended that the income
accruing during the three year period after the death of the testator
became a part of the corpus of the trust estate and was not distributable
as income. The trustees sought the advice of the court, and were directed to pay over the disputed income to the income beneficiaries.
The exact question in this case is whether the income accruing during the three year period belonged to the corpus, or was part of the
income to be distributed after the lapse of three years to the income
beneficiary. Apart from the problem of construction here, this is very
closely related to the problem of the allocation of income earned during
the period of administration of an estate. This problem can be stated:
when the residue of an estate, after payment of debts, costs of administration, and legacies, is bequeathed in trust for certain named beneficiaries, there is income earned upon the money that is eventually used
to pay the debts, administration costs, and legacies. This income
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accrues during the period of the administration. Should it constitute
a part of the corpus, or should it be dispersed to the income beneficiaries as income?
The law in American courts is by no means settled on this point.
There exists today a sharp divergence of opinion, which is irreconcilable; one view is titled the Massachusetts rule, the other is known as
the English rule.
It is the general rule in the overwhelming majority of American
and English courts that, in the absence of directions in the will to the
contrary, a life beneficiary of a residuary trust is entitled to the income thereon from the date of the testator's death. Sargent v. Sargent, 103 Mass. 297 (1869); Williamson v. Williamson, 6 Paige 298
(N. Y. 1837); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 210 N. C. 339,
186 S. E. 335 (1936); In re Leitsch, 185 Wis. 257, 201 N. W. 284
(1924); Taylor v. Clark, 1 Hare 161, 66 Eng. Rep. 990 (1841); Angerstein v. Martin, Turn. & R. 232, 37 Eng. Rep. 1087 (1823).
The so-called Massachusetts rule, which is set out in 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS
§ 234.3 (1939), states that unless it is otherwise directed by the testator in his will, any income earned by the estate during the period of
administration, including the earnings upon the testator's property used
to pay the debts and costs of administration, should be treated as income and not as principal. This rule is based upon a long line of wellreasoned Massachusetts decisions. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Smith, 166
Mass. 500, 165 N. E. 657 (1929); McDonough v. Montague, 259
Mass. 612, 157 N. E. 159 (1927); Cushing v. Burrell, 137 Mass. 21
(1884); Treadwell v. Cordis, 71 Mass. 341 (1855); Lovering v. Minot,
63 Mass. 151 (1851); Minot v. Amory, 56 Mass. 377 (1848). These
early Massachusetts cases based their rejection of the English rule upon
a studied argument. The court in Minot v. Amory, supra, held that
the residue was to be considered as formed, subject to the payment of
debts, legacies, and charges, and that income was to be computed and
payable at and from the death of the testator. The court said, 56
Mass. at 382:
This carries a clear implication, that the formation of the trust fund,
for purpose of yielding income, should be coevil with the time from and
after which income would be required from such fund . . . from decease
of testator; and it manifests his intention, expressed by the will, that the
income of his whole property, not necessary for the payment of debts and
legacies, should go to form that fund. . . . The income accruing after
decease of testator was properly received by the executor; but it should
be indicated as income in their executorship account.

This same result was reached in Lovering v. Minot, supra, where the
court likewise based its decision on the intent of the testator. The
court stated that if it were to rule that the income during the period
of administration should go to the corpus, it would remove it from the
first taker selected by the testator, and apply it to an accumulation for
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the benefit of the secondary recipient. The court pointed out that it
was contrary to the presumed intention of the testator to narrow the
benefit intended for the first object of his bounty, for the benefit of
one more remote.
In the leading case of Treadwell v. Cordis, supra, these holdings
were re-affirmed. It was pointed out that in the absence of words to
the contrary, the residue must be considered as formed at the moment
of the death of the testator. Where the gift of the residue is after the
payment of debts, charges, and legacies, the residue is to be formed
subject to these payments even though they are made at a later time.
Later cases have not departed from these earlier decisions as can be
seen in McDonough v. Montague, supra. And in 1929, the Massachusetts rule was crystallized in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Smith, supra,
which was a case similar to the instant one. There the testator gave
"the rest, residue and remainder" of his estate in trust for investment
and reinvestment for collection and payment of the income as directed,
and for final distribution of the principal of the trust. The controversy arose as to the amount which represented the income derived
from funds used to pay the debts, legacies, and expenses of administration between the date of the testator's death and the time the trust
estate was turned over to the trustee. The precise question was whether
that sum ought to be distributed to the beneficiary of the trust fund
as income or added to and incorporated into the principal of the residue. The court reviewed the Massachusetts decisions on the problem,
pointed out the reasons as stated above on which the Massachuetts rule
was founded, and declared the unwillingness of the court to deviate from
that precedent.
The Massachuetts rule has been adopted in North Carolina, the
state in which the instant case has arisen, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island and Wisconsin. Cannon v. Cannon, 225 N. C. 611, 36 S. E. (2d)
17 (1945); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, supra; Davidson v.
Miners' & Mechanics S. & T. Co., 129 Ohio St. 418, 195 N. E. 845
(1935); City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Taylor, 53 R. I. 126, 163
At. 734 (1933); In re Leitsch, supra. All of these cases adhere to and
reiterate the reasoning of the Massachusetts courts.
New York, in the leading cases of Matter of Benson, 51 Sickels 499
(N. Y. 1884), and Williamson v. Williamson, supra, had adhered to the
English rule. But, in 1931, New York passed a statute adopting the
Massachusetts rule. N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAw § 17-b. The reason for
the New York amendment, as pointed out in City Bank Farmers' Trust
Co. v. Taylor, supra, a Rhode Island case, was to simplify the computation of the residue where it is given in trust for certain named beneficiaries. The amendment provides that income earned on the funds
during the period of administration should be paid to the income beneficiary. The former practice of capitalizing this income was claimed to

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
be unduly complicated and imposed too great a burden upon the attorneys and accountants, a further reason why the courts which follow
the Massachusetts rule adhere to it. A statute similar" to the one in
New York, also has been passed in Maryland. Md. Laws, c. 672 (1949).
The Restatement of Trusts has adopted the English rule, and declares that income received during the period of administration, obtained
from property which subsequently is used in paying debts, legacies,
and costs of administration, and which has not been applied to the payment of interest on such debts and costs, should be taken by the trustee
and added to the principal. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 234(g) (1935).
(It must be noted that the instant case states that the Restatement
has adopted the Massachusetts rule; however, it is clearly seen that
this is the more general allocation rule that the court is referring to.)
This rule, adhered to by many American courts, is founded upon
early English decisions, and is still followed by the courts of that nation.
McEuen v. Phelps, [1913] 2 Ch. 704; Allheusen v. Whittell, L. R. 4
Eq. 295 (1867); Hewitt v. Morris, Turn. & R. 241, 37 Eng. Rep. 1090
(1824); Angerstein v. Martin, supra. The English cases were discussed
in the early American case of Williamson v. Williamson, supra, 6 Paige
at 304 (which has been overruled by the New York statute), where
the court said:
The result of the English cases appears to be . . . that in the bequest of a life estate in a residuary fund, and where no time is prescribed
in the will for the commencement of the interest or the enjoyment of the
use or income of such residue, the legatee for life is entitled to the interest
or income of the clear residue, as afterwards ascertained, to be computed
from the time of the death of the testator.

This view has been affirmed in the District of Columbia and the
states of Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Virginia. Proctor v. American S. & T. Co., 98 F. (2d) 599,
(D. C. Cir. 1938); Bridgeport Trust Co. v. Fowler, 102 Conn. 318,
128 At. 719 (1925); Bradford v. Fidelity Trust Co., 12 Del. Ch. 56,
104 Atl. 777 (1918); Grainger Executors & Trustees v. Pennebaker
et al., 247 Ky. 324, 56 S. W. (2d) 1007 (1932); White v. Chaplin, 84
N. H. 208, 148 Atl. 21 (1929); Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Glunz, 121
N. J. Eq. 593, 191 Adt. 795 (1937); Rosenberger v. Rosenberger, 184
Va. 1024, 37 S. E. (2d) 55 (1946).
Proctor v. American S. & T. Co., supra, is one of the leading cases
supporting the English rule. There also a testator died possessed of a
large estate, which he bequeathed in trust, with direction to convert all
"rest, residue, and remainder" of his estate into cash and sound securities, the net income to be paid to several named beneficiaries, with remainders over. The court pointed out that the difference between the
two rules lies in their respective interpretations of the words "rest, residue, and remainder." It stated that when a testator sets up a residuary
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trust and directs that the residue of his estate be transferred to such
trust, and that the life beneficiaries are to take the net income therefrom, the testator's intention is just as he has literally expressed it. The
court reasoned that the portion of the estate which has not been expressly disposed of by will after the payment of administration expenses,
debts, and legacies is the residue actually intended, and until that time
it cannot be ascertained. It is impossible to have any income on the
residue before the residue is ascertained.
It is upon this meaning of the term residue that the adherents to
the English rule have based their decisions. The courts have reasoned
that the income from assets which are later used to pay debts and legacies is not income from the residue, but income from property which
never becomes a part of the residue because it is given to other uses.
Hence, the income itself is a part of the residue. So the income received from property sold to pay costs of administration, debts, and
legacies is not to be paid to the income beneficiaries, but is to be added
to the corpus of the residuary estate.
The Proctor case contained an excellent discussion of the words
"rest, residue and remainder." The court, in commenting on Stanley v.
Stanley, 108 Conn. 100, 142 At. 851 (1928), quoted from the Connecticut decision in which the court very concisely pointed out the
definition of those words:
The residue is that portion of an estate that remains after the payment
of debts, legacies, and administration charges. Into it, and forming a
part of it, must go . . . the income and accretions of the estate which are
undisposed of. The residue includes every part of the etsate not otherwise disposed of by the will.

The court, in the Proctor case, further felt that the difficulty of
computation, which is advanced by the adherents of the Massachusetts rule as a reason for rejecting the English rule, would not justify
a breaking away from "authority, reason, or fairness to parties."
Both the rules seem to be well-reasoned, yet irreconcilable. Since
the divergence rests simply upon the different interpretations of the
word "residue," it is difficult to determine which is the better rule based
upon that consideration alone. However, the followers of the Massachusetts rule attempt to point out that the intent of the testator is to
benefit those closer to his heart, and place the English rule interpretation on the word "residue" would be to benefit those who were more
remote in his affection and esteem. Since there is this presumed intent
of the testator, coupled with the practical consideration of the facility
of computation, it is submitted that the Massachusetts rule, as is applied in the principal case, is the better doctrine.
Thomas A. Muscatello

